Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/IgorGanapolsky/ThumbGatenpx agentmods add skills/igorganapolsky/thumbgate/bluesky-engagementWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/igorganapolsky/thumbgate/bluesky-engagement)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/igorganapolsky/thumbgate/bluesky-engagement"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/igorganapolsky/thumbgate/bluesky-engagement/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/igorganapolsky/thumbgate/bluesky-engagement"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/igorganapolsky/thumbgate/bluesky-engagement.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 5 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Rogue Agent · line 55 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 70 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 71 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 72 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 72 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00096 | $0.01749 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00038 | $0.00700 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00019 | $0.00350 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00175 |
Grade A, and why
bluesky-engagement scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 117 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Bluesky Engagement
Automation for Bluesky reply tracking. The monitor reads; a human (or a queue consumer with explicit approval) writes.
Why this exists
Bluesky is a Zernio-connected channel for publishing, but Zernio does not expose an inbound/comments API. Engagement has to run directly against the open AT Protocol. This skill owns that path so future sessions don't re-ask for credentials or re-derive the PDS routing.
Credentials
Both are set in .env at repo root (git-ignored):
| Var | Source | Notes |
|---|---|---|
BLUESKY_HANDLE |
bsky profile URL | e.g. iganapolsky.bsky.social |
BLUESKY_APP_PASSWORD |
https://bsky.app/settings/app-passwords | Scoped, revocable. Never use the account login password. |
Rotation: revoke the old app password at the settings URL above, generate a new one named thumbgate-replies, and replace the value on the BLUESKY_APP_PASSWORD= line of .env. No other files need updating.
Architecture
launchd (com.thumbgate.bluesky-reply-monitor)
└─ every 900s ─> node scripts/social-reply-monitor-bluesky.js
├─ com.atproto.server.createSession (bsky.social)
│ └─ reads didDoc to find user's real PDS
├─ app.bsky.notification.listNotifications (user's PDS)
├─ filter reason in {reply, mention, quote}
├─ dedupe against .thumbgate/reply-monitor-state.json
├─ generateReply() — shared with Reddit/X monitor
└─ append to .thumbgate/reply-drafts.jsonl
Federation note: authenticated AT Protocol calls must hit the user's own PDS (session.didDoc.service[].serviceEndpoint), not bsky.social. Hitting bsky.social returns 502 UpstreamFailure. This was the first bug.
Transient failures: Bluesky's appview returns 502 during incidents. The monitor detects 5xx / UpstreamFailure / ECONNRESET and exits 0 so launchd doesn't mark the agent failed.
File layout
| Path | Purpose | Tracked? |
|---|---|---|
scripts/social-reply-monitor-bluesky.js |
The monitor itself | yes |
~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.thumbgate.bluesky-reply-monitor.plist |
15-min schedule | no (user-scope) |
.thumbgate/reply-monitor-state.json |
Dedupe state (also used by Reddit/X monitor) | no |
.thumbgate/reply-drafts.jsonl |
Human-review queue | no |
.thumbgate/bluesky-monitor-stdout.log |
launchd stdout | no |
.thumbgate/bluesky-monitor-stderr.log |
launchd stderr (transient 502 warnings land here) | no |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 117 lines · 96 tokens per session scan A b987feffe6a9
bluesky-engagement is a skill published in the GitHub repository IgorGanapolsky/ThumbGate (29 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 96 tokens to every session and 1,749 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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