Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add jamditis/claude-skills-journalism --skill supply-chain-hardeninggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/jamditis/claude-skills-journalismWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/jamditis/claude-skills-journalism/supply-chain-hardening)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/jamditis/claude-skills-journalism/supply-chain-hardening"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/jamditis/claude-skills-journalism/supply-chain-hardening/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/jamditis/claude-skills-journalism/supply-chain-hardening"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/jamditis/claude-skills-journalism/supply-chain-hardening.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 7 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 24 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 30 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 92 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 24 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 74 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 92 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 91 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00034 | $0.02022 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00017 | $0.01011 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00404 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00202 |
Grade A, and why
supply-chain-hardening scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootlowPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
1. Verify npm >= 11: `npm --version`. If older, upgrade (`sudo npm i -g npm@latest` or tarball-swap if self-upgrade races). Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 114 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Supply-chain hardening
Defends a journalism toolchain against the dominant npm/bun supply-chain attack pattern: a maintainer account or CI pipeline is compromised, a malicious version ships, and machines install it before anyone notices. Recent example: the Mini Shai-Hulud TanStack attack (2026-05-11) compromised 84 versions across 42 @tanstack/* packages and exfiltrated AWS / GCP / Vault / GitHub / SSH credentials via a postinstall script.
The defense is layered and intentionally simple:
- Install-time cooldown, only install package versions older than N days (default 7). This is the primary defense. By the time the cooldown expires, the security community has almost always flagged a compromised version and the registry has yanked it.
- Sandboxed pre-install scan, when the cooldown has to be bypassed (CVE patch, fresh dep, urgent install), run the candidate tarball through a static-analysis scan that looks for the diagnostic signatures of supply-chain malware. The scan runs inside
bwrap/firejail/unshareso a malicious package can't escape the inspection. --ignore-scriptsat install, postinstall is the #1 attack vector. Skip lifecycle scripts on every cooldown-bypass install.
These three together would have blocked the Mini Shai-Hulud TanStack attack on a stock laptop with no human in the loop.
Configure the cooldown
Verified config keys (npm v11+ and bun 1.3+):
| Manager | File | Key | Units | Exclusion key |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm | ~/.npmrc (or project .npmrc) |
min-release-age |
days | none yet, proposed in npm/cli#8994 |
| bun | ~/.bunfig.toml (or project bunfig.toml) |
[install] minimumReleaseAge |
seconds | [install] minimumReleaseAgeExcludes = [] (exact names, no globs) |
Minimal config:
# ~/.npmrc
min-release-age=7
# ~/.bunfig.toml
[install]
minimumReleaseAge = 604800 # 7 days
minimumReleaseAgeExcludes = []
Requires npm 11+. Older npm silently ignores unknown keys, so the config looks correct but does nothing. Check with npm --version and npm config get min-release-age (should echo 7, not null).
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 114 lines · 34 tokens per session scan A f8b13c9172fd
supply-chain-hardening is a skill published in the GitHub repository jamditis/claude-skills-journalism (391 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 34 tokens to every session and 2,022 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (asks for root). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-05.
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