Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add JasonColapietro/suede-creator-skills --skill suede-ship-copygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/JasonColapietro/suede-creator-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/jasoncolapietro/suede-creator-skills/suede-ship-copy)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/jasoncolapietro/suede-creator-skills/suede-ship-copy"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/jasoncolapietro/suede-creator-skills/suede-ship-copy/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/jasoncolapietro/suede-creator-skills/suede-ship-copy"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/jasoncolapietro/suede-creator-skills/suede-ship-copy.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 2 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Rogue Agent · line 11 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 16 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00197 | $0.05844 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00098 | $0.02922 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00039 | $0.01169 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00020 | $0.00584 |
Grade A, and why
suede-ship-copy scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 418 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Suede Ship Copy
The copy side of the canonical Suede DAG. One brief in, one publishable draft out, with about thirty agents in between arranged as a graph rather than a chain.
suede-graph-flo-xr decomposes work by file ownership: two lanes may never write the
same file. This decomposes by message ownership: two sections may never make
the same point, and no section may assert a fact an agent invented. Same graph,
different collision rule.
Model selection — Fable capped at 4 without asking
Subagents inherit the session model unless the spawning call names one. Nothing in this skill picks a model, so every agent it fans out lands on whatever the session happens to be set to. That is how a run sized against one allocation gets billed to another without anyone choosing it.
Up to 4 concurrent Fable subagents are allowed without an explicit Fable instruction. Beyond that, Fable must be specified — every range this skill offers (30 at the narrowest) is far beyond 4, so its fan-out never runs on Fable unless the user named Fable for this run. An inherited session model is not a specification — "the session was already on it" is not the user asking. Absent an explicit Fable instruction, do one of two things before launching: name a different model on the agent calls, or state plainly that the run will bill to the Fable allocation and get an answer. Silence is not consent to spend it.
Whose claims get audited
The audit exists to catch agents inventing things. It never runs on the requester.
A research lens that reports "cold start drops to 40ms" is a machine asserting a number, and it gets opened against its source. The requester saying the same thing in the brief is the person who owns the product telling you a fact about it. Those are not the same input and this workflow never treats them as the same input.
Anything the requester supplies — the brief, the given list, mustSay strings —
enters the permitted claim set marked origin: "user" and is exempt at every
stage:
What ships with it
3 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 418 lines · 197 tokens per session scan A 35adc5e49fda
suede-ship-copy is a skill published in the GitHub repository JasonColapietro/suede-creator-skills (135 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 197 tokens to every session and 5,844 once invoked, about $0.0010 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
skill-router
Use when a [skill-router] route card appears in the turn, when no card appeared on a non-trivial task, or when a route looks wrong. Routes every prompt to the right installed skill, pairs it with a process skill, tiers enforcement, and briefs sub-agents. 79 local skills + plugin skills indexed.
generate-report
Generate a comprehensive summary report of the latest experiment including metrics, plots, and comparison with baseline. Use this after training and evaluation to create a shareable experiment summary.
evaluate-model
Load the latest model checkpoint, run evaluation on the test set, and generate a metrics report with confusion matrix. Use this after training to assess model performance or to re-evaluate a specific checkpoint.
run-pipeline
Run the full data science pipeline: validate raw data, preprocess, engineer features, train model, and evaluate. Use this when you want to execute the end-to-end ML pipeline or re-run it after data or code changes.
api-test
Run API integration tests against the running backend, verify endpoints return expected responses and status codes. Use after deploying a preview or starting the dev server.
run-simulator
Build and launch the app in the iOS Simulator. Automatically selects an appropriate simulator device, boots it if needed, and installs and launches the app.