Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add jeremylongshore/claude-code-slack-channel --skill policygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/jeremylongshore/claude-code-slack-channelWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/jeremylongshore/claude-code-slack-channel/policy)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/jeremylongshore/claude-code-slack-channel/policy"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/jeremylongshore/claude-code-slack-channel/policy/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/jeremylongshore/claude-code-slack-channel/policy"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/jeremylongshore/claude-code-slack-channel/policy.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 10 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 176 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 3 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 45 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 54 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 91 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 165 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 102 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 156 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 184 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 185 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00072 | $0.02529 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00036 | $0.01264 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00014 | $0.00506 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00253 |
Grade A, and why
policy scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured today.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 189 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
/slack-channel:policy
Overview
Author, lint, and remove policy rules under access.json's top-level policy field.
The evaluator (evaluate() in policy.ts) is the veto layer for every MCP tool
call — this skill is the ergonomic front door to authoring rules without opening
access.json in a text editor.
See ACCESS.md §Policy schema
for the full rule shape and semantics. This skill does not replace the hand-edit
path; it complements it.
Prerequisites
- A completed install (
/slack-channel:install) — the state file~/.claude/channels/slack/access.jsonmust exist. - Bun available on PATH — every write is validated by running
bun scripts/policy-validate.tsfrom the plugin repo. - Familiarity with the rule shape in
ACCESS.md§Policy schema (linked above) helps when composingjson-matchobjects.
Usage
/slack-channel:policy list
/slack-channel:policy lint
/slack-channel:policy add <id> <effect> <json-match> [--reason "..."] [--ttl-ms N] [--approvers N] [--priority N]
/slack-channel:policy remove <id>
Effect is one of auto_approve, deny, require_approval.
json-match is a JSON object literal for the match field — e.g.
'{"tool":"read_file","pathPrefix":"/workspace/docs"}'. At least one field
must be populated; the validator rejects empty matches.
Options by effect
| Effect | Required | Optional |
|---|---|---|
auto_approve |
— | --priority |
deny |
--reason "…" (1-200) |
--priority |
require_approval |
— | --ttl-ms, --approvers, --priority |
Defaults: priority=100, ttl-ms=300000 (5 min), approvers=1.
State file
~/.claude/channels/slack/access.json — the policy field is a JSON array.
A missing or empty array means "no authored rules" and is valid.
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- today Changed · +3 lines · +2 tokens per session c97c3e5880a8
- 10d ago First seen · 186 lines · 70 tokens per session scan A 5a0f330c15a1
policy is a skill published in the GitHub repository jeremylongshore/claude-code-slack-channel (39 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 72 tokens to every session and 2,529 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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cis-aws-compute-5.7
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c-slack
Send messages and upload files to Slack channels using the slack CLI. Supports direct messages, channel posts, file uploads, and thread replies.
bot-state
Show where this bot's memory actually lives — state root, summaries, attachments, outbox, buffer, sessions — and what is in each. Use when asked where files go, why a summary or attachment is missing, or to check the bot's storage layout.
forge-cli
A command-line management tool for Forge Hub, a service that connects agent instances to chat channels and routes messages between them.
subagent-driven-development
Execute plans via delegatetask subagents (2-stage review).
mcporter
List, auth, and call MCP servers/tools from the terminal.