pstack-claude is a set of opinionated coding-agent skills and workflows ported from Cursor to Claude Code, Codex, Pi, and other agent harnesses. It guides agents toward concise, simple, and verified code by routing goals to suitable workflows and supporting subagent tools. The catalogue entries are the project's skills, agents, hook, and plugin implementations for these agent environments.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add michael-denyer/pstack-claude --skill interrogategit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/michael-denyer/pstack-claudeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/michael-denyer/pstack-claude/interrogate)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/michael-denyer/pstack-claude/interrogate"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/michael-denyer/pstack-claude/interrogate/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/michael-denyer/pstack-claude/interrogate"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/michael-denyer/pstack-claude/interrogate.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
- Socket pass
- Snyk pass
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Rogue Agent · line 34 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00051 | $0.01322 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00020 | $0.00529 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00264 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00132 |
Grade A, and why
interrogate scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
Copies of this mod
2 near-identical copies found in the catalogue:
- interrogate — 89% identical, 92 lines differ
- interrogate — 88% identical, 25 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 84 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Interrogate
On Codex, read the platform mapping, including its per-skill notes, before following this skill.
On GitHub Copilot, read the platform mapping, including its per-skill notes, before following this skill.
Spawn one reviewer per configured model to adversarially review code changes. The adversarial signal comes from model diversity, not assigned personas. The deliverable is a synthesized verdict. Do NOT auto-apply changes.
Step 1, Scope
Identify what to review from context:
- If the user points at specific files or a diff, use that.
- If on a feature branch, run
git diff main...HEAD(or the appropriate base branch) for the full changeset. - If the user's message references recent work, gather the relevant files.
Package the diff or file contents with any surrounding context files the reviewers need to understand the code.
Step 2, Intent
Before spawning reviewers, state the intent in one clear paragraph from the user's message, commit messages, the PR description if one exists, and the code. If you're unsure about the intent, ask the user before proceeding.
Step 3, Spawn Reviewers
Launch all reviewers in a single message with the Agent tool, one per entry on the interrogate reviewers line in pstack-models.md, labeled Reviewer A, B, and so on to match the entry count. If the sheet or that line is missing, use the table defaults.
| Subagent | Default model |
|---|---|
| Reviewer A | opus |
| Reviewer B | fable |
| Reviewer C | sonnet |
| Reviewer D | haiku |
Each reviewer gets subagent_type: "general-purpose", readonly: true, and model set to its configured entry, or its table default when there is no configured line. Omit model for an auto or inherit-parent entry, so that reviewer runs on the parent model.
If the Agent tool rejects a configured entry, run that reviewer on its family's table default and say so. Families go by model name, such as Opus, Fable, or Sonnet. With no family match, use Reviewer A's default. If it rejects a table default, spawn with the closest equivalent from the valid slugs in its error message (prefer the same family and reasoning tier), and open a separate PR to update the default table. Do not block the review on the slug issue. Never treat an alias entry as a rejected slug or apply either fallback to it.
What ships with it
4 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2d ago Changed 4218ed6cdb83
- 5d ago Changed · -35 lines 4d8f8d437092
- 9d ago Changed · +1 lines f05deea40b69
- 12d ago Changed · +2 lines e563112f57ac
- 19d ago Changed fd4f1dbe7851
- 22d ago Changed · +4 lines d726b839d374
- 24d ago Changed 11dbf8d9089b
- 25d ago Changed 4aac2eda080b
- 1mo ago Changed e5c088b35396
- 1mo ago First seen · 112 lines · 51 tokens per session scan A 96c182953d24
interrogate is a skill published in the GitHub repository michael-denyer/pstack-claude (2,777 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 51 tokens to every session and 1,322 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
code-review-excellence
Master effective code review practices to provide constructive feedback, catch bugs early, and foster knowledge sharing while maintaining team morale. Use when reviewing pull requests, establishing review standards, or mentoring developers.
multi-reviewer-patterns
Coordinate parallel code reviews across multiple quality dimensions with finding deduplication, severity calibration, and consolidated reporting. Use this skill when organizing multi-reviewer code reviews, calibrating finding severity, or consolidating review results.
ln-33-plan-reviewer
Reviews a concrete implementation plan for missing decisions, feasibility and risk before execution; read-only.
ln-52-delivery-reviewer
Reviews a completed change for acceptance, regressions and release risk; read-only, not a whole-codebase audit.
ln-55-test-suite-auditor
Audits existing tests for risk coverage, reliable oracles and maintenance value; does not edit tests.
ln-32-test-strategy-planner
Plans risk-based test portfolios and acceptance evidence; does not write or execute tests.