race-condition

race-condition is a skill for Claude Code, Codex from MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas. It costs 80 tokens per session (1,762 once invoked), scanned A, a copy of race-condition, Apache-2.0.

A security testing guide for race conditions, where two requests act on shared data before the application has safely finished checking it. TOCTOU means “time of check to time of use,” describing this gap between checking and acting.

In plain words
What is it for?
It is for testing concurrent requests against login flows, balances, quotas, coupons, transfers, and other endpoints that change data.
Why use it?
It helps find bugs where parallel requests can bypass checks or repeat an action that should happen only once. Examples include double spending, coupon reuse, and unsafe session updates.

Skill for Claude CodeCodex

Written for no agent in particular: nothing here depends on one.

Good fit It is for testing concurrent requests against login flows, balances, quotas, coupons, transfers, and other endpoints that change data.

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Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/race-condition
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent
npx skills add MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas --skill race-condition
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas

Made for: Claude Code, Codex.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for race-condition

README.md
[![agentmods](https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/race-condition/github.svg)](https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/race-condition)
Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/race-condition"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/race-condition/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for race-condition

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/race-condition"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/mingyiseclab/mingyi-atlas/race-condition.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 80 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 1,762 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 1 finding. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe.
Origin 97% copy Near-identical to another mod in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00080 $0.01762
Opus 5 $0.00040 $0.00881
Sonnet 5 $0.00016 $0.00352
Haiku 4.5 $0.00008 $0.00176

Measured 9d ago against content hash da26b2bd1484, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-12, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

race-condition scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Makes network callslowCapability

Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.

return requests.post(URL, cookies=COOKIES, data=PAYLOAD, timeout=5).status_code
Origin

This is a copy

97% identical to race-condition — 1 line differ, which has more behind it and is treated as the original. This page carries a canonical link to it rather than competing with it.

src/skills/standard/exploit/web/race-condition/SKILL.md · 139 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 139 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Race Conditions (TOCTOU)

Exploits applications that check authorization or state at one moment and act on it at another, or that write session state before validating it. The race window is the time between check and act — wider windows (slow ops like bcrypt/Argon2, DB round-trips, network calls) make the race trivially winnable.

Recognition Signals

Trigger this skill when ANY of the following are present:

  • Slow auth path: bcrypt/Argon2/PBKDF2 in login (>50ms login latency on wrong password). The hash compute widens any race window touching the same session row.
  • session[k] = form[k] BEFORE validation: e.g. login writes session["user"] = posted_username before checking the password — the session row carries attacker-chosen state during the bcrypt sleep.
  • Check-then-act money flows: balance/quota/coupon/transfer endpoints that do if x.balance >= n: x.balance -= n without a single atomic UPDATE-with-WHERE-balance>=n.
  • Idempotency-key-less POSTs to mutating endpoints — same payload N times in parallel produces N writes.
  • Challenge tag includes race_condition, toctou, concurrent, last-write-wins, or double-spend. (Note: smuggling_desync is a parser-disagreement attack, NOT a race — route to /skills/standard/exploit/web/smuggling/SKILL.md.)
  • Session-coupled endpoints: a POST that mutates session, AND a GET that trusts that session, both reachable concurrently.

Single-Endpoint Race — Double Submit

Classic case: one endpoint, fire N parallel requests with the same payload. Server check-then-act loses to itself. Always start here — it's the cheapest probe.

# python3 -c "$(cat << 'PY' ... PY)" — keep timeout ≤ 5s, count ≤ 30
python3 - <<'PY'
import concurrent.futures, requests, sys

URL = "https://<TARGET>/redeem"
COOKIES = {"session": "<SESSION>"}
PAYLOAD = {"coupon": "ONETIME50"}
N = 20

def fire(_):
    return requests.post(URL, cookies=COOKIES, data=PAYLOAD, timeout=5).status_code

with concurrent.futures.ThreadPoolExecutor(max_workers=N) as ex:
    codes = list(ex.map(fire, range(N)))

print("status counts:", {c: codes.count(c) for c in set(codes)})
print("non-error wins:", sum(1 for c in codes if 200 <= c < 300))
PY

Read the full file on GitHub · 139 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 9d ago First seen · 139 lines · 80 tokens per session scan A da26b2bd1484

Subscribe to this mod's changes

race-condition is a skill published in the GitHub repository MingyiSecLab/Mingyi-Atlas (11 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 80 tokens to every session and 1,762 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). It is 97% identical to race-condition, differing in 1 line, and is treated as a copy.