Moltis is a persistent personal agent server written in Rust that runs on hardware controlled by its user. It provides an AI agent with sandboxed command execution, model-provider connections, memory, voice, scheduling, messaging integrations, browser automation, and MCP tools. Its catalogue add-ons extend the agent’s workflows and available tools.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add moltis-org/moltis --skill github-authgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/moltis-org/moltisWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/moltis-org/moltis/github-auth)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/moltis-org/moltis/github-auth"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/moltis-org/moltis/github-auth/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/moltis-org/moltis/github-auth"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/moltis-org/moltis/github-auth.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 16 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 16 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 44 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 48 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 70 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 189 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 239 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 65 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 208 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 224 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 225 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 123 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 126 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 36 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 245 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 116 Code scans file system directories looking for sensitive files. This could be reconnaissance for credential theft.Fix: Remove unnecessary filesystem scanning. If file access is needed, use explicit, scoped paths. Avoid reading ~/.ssh, ~/.aws, or credential directories.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 199 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00048 | $0.01930 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00019 | $0.00772 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00386 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00193 |
Grade A, and why
github-auth scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
Copies of this mod
8 near-identical copies found in the catalogue:
- github-auth — 91% identical, 22 lines differ
- github-auth — 89% identical, 21 lines differ
- github-auth — 89% identical, 20 lines differ
- github-auth — 88% identical, 21 lines differ
- github-auth — 88% identical, 24 lines differ
- github-auth — 88% identical, 28 lines differ
- github-auth — 88% identical, 66 lines differ
- github-auth — 88% identical, 24 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 246 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
GitHub Authentication Setup
This skill sets up authentication so the agent can work with GitHub repositories, PRs, issues, and CI. It covers two paths:
git(always available) — uses HTTPS personal access tokens or SSH keysghCLI (if installed) — richer GitHub API access with a simpler auth flow
Detection Flow
When a user asks you to work with GitHub, run this check first:
# Check what's available
git --version
gh --version 2>/dev/null || echo "gh not installed"
# Check if already authenticated
gh auth status 2>/dev/null || echo "gh not authenticated"
git config --global credential.helper 2>/dev/null || echo "no git credential helper"
Decision tree:
- If
gh auth statusshows authenticated → you're good, useghfor everything - If
ghis installed but not authenticated → use "gh auth" method below - If
ghis not installed → use "git-only" method below (no sudo needed)
Method 1: Git-Only Authentication (No gh, No sudo)
This works on any machine with git installed. No root access needed.
Option A: HTTPS with Personal Access Token (Recommended)
This is the most portable method — works everywhere, no SSH config needed.
Step 1: Create a personal access token
Tell the user to go to: https://github.com/settings/tokens
- Click "Generate new token (classic)"
- Give it a name like "moltis"
- Select scopes:
repo(full repository access — read, write, push, PRs)workflow(trigger and manage GitHub Actions)read:org(if working with organization repos)
- Set expiration (90 days is a good default)
- Copy the token — it won't be shown again
Step 2: Configure git to store the token
# Set up the credential helper to cache credentials
# "store" saves to ~/.git-credentials in plaintext (simple, persistent)
git config --global credential.helper store
# Now do a test operation that triggers auth — git will prompt for credentials
# Username: <their-github-username>
# Password: <paste the personal access token, NOT their GitHub password>
git ls-remote https://github.com/<their-username>/<any-repo>.git
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 246 lines · 48 tokens per session scan F 41ab2e38df67
github-auth is a skill published in the GitHub repository moltis-org/moltis (2,897 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 48 tokens to every session and 1,930 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
update-recovery
Use when an update leaves out owner customizations or they need restoring or merging.
pre-release-check
The final gate before a release is cut — go green, reconcile the release PR against what actually landed, sweep what CI can't see, check the roadmap and ADR statuses, optionally deep-review, then return a ship-or-hold verdict.
openclaw-github-dedupe
Investigate a cluster of GitHub issues and PRs, determine canonical candidates, post duplicate/related status, preserve contributor credit, and execute cleanup actions. Supports autonomous mode for provided-link-only closeout, merge/fix follow-through, changelog, and post-merge issue/PR cleanup.
openclaw-pr-batch-sweep
Select, review, repair, validate, and land batches of up to 20 low-risk OpenClaw contributor pull requests using Vincent's maintainer preferences and bounded sub-agent lanes. Use for "next 20", broad contributor PR sweeps, merge-candidate mining, or continued PR-batch work where drafts, maintainer work, trivial…
operations-worktree
Create managed Git worktrees from a verified healthy owner, verify dependency reuse, and report explicit checkout and recovery outcomes.
org-branch-cleanup
Audit and safely prune stale branches across a GitHub organization with immutable snapshots, conservative merged-PR classification, live SHA/protection/open-PR revalidation, resumable deletion ledgers, and post-delete verification. Use when a maintainer asks to clean up old, dead, merged, bot-created, or abandoned…