Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/NVIDIA-NeMo/Megatron-Bridgenpx agentmods add skills/nvidia-nemo/megatron-bridge/build-and-dependencyWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/nvidia-nemo/megatron-bridge/build-and-dependency)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/nvidia-nemo/megatron-bridge/build-and-dependency"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/nvidia-nemo/megatron-bridge/build-and-dependency/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/nvidia-nemo/megatron-bridge/build-and-dependency"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/nvidia-nemo/megatron-bridge/build-and-dependency.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 6 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 36 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 48 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 156 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 126 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
- low Tool Misuse · line 48 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- low Tool Misuse · line 156 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00038 | $0.01665 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00019 | $0.00833 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00008 | $0.00333 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00167 |
Grade A, and why
build-and-dependency scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 180 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Build and Dependency
Two core principles: build and develop inside containers, and always use uv.
Why Containers
Megatron Bridge depends on CUDA, NCCL, PyTorch with GPU support, Transformer Engine, and optional components like TRT-LLM, vLLM, and DeepEP. Installing these on a bare host is fragile and hard to reproduce. The project ships production-quality Dockerfiles that pin every dependency.
Use the container as your development environment. This guarantees:
- Identical CUDA / NCCL / cuDNN versions across developers and CI.
uv.lockresolves the same way locally and in CI (the lockfile is Linux-only; it cannot be regenerated on macOS).- GPU-dependent operations work out of the box.
Container Options
Option 1: NeMo Framework Container (fastest)
Find available tags at https://catalog.ngc.nvidia.com/orgs/nvidia/containers/nemo/tags
skopeo list-tags docker://nvcr.io/nvidia/nemo \
| python3 -c "import sys,json,re; tags=json.load(sys.stdin)['Tags']; [print(t) for t in sorted((t for t in tags if re.match(r'^\d{2}\.\d{2}', t)), reverse=True)]"
docker run --rm -it --gpus all --shm-size=24g \
nvcr.io/nvidia/nemo:<tag> \
bash
Option 2: Build the Megatron Bridge Container
See @docker/README.md for build commands, build arguments, and the full NeMo-FW image stack.
Running the Container
docker run --rm -it -w /opt/Megatron-Bridge \
-v $(pwd):/opt/Megatron-Bridge \
-v $HOME/.cache/uv:/root/.cache/uv \
--gpus all \
--shm-size=24g \
--ulimit memlock=-1 \
--ulimit stack=67108864 \
megatron-bridge:latest \
bash
Mounting $HOME/.cache/uv avoids re-downloading wheels on every run.
Containers on Slurm
On Slurm clusters with Enroot/Pyxis, pass containers directly to srun:
srun --mpi=pmix \
--container-image="$CONTAINER_IMAGE" \
--container-mounts="$CONTAINER_MOUNTS" \
--no-container-mount-home \
bash -c "cd /opt/Megatron-Bridge && uv run --no-sync python ..."
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 180 lines · 38 tokens per session scan A c4844cb1517b
build-and-dependency is a skill published in the GitHub repository NVIDIA-NeMo/Megatron-Bridge (904 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 38 tokens to every session and 1,665 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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