Borrowing it
Nothing to install: this file belongs to Othmane-Khadri/YALC-the-GTM-operating-system. Take a copy, put it at the same path in your own repository, and replace the rules that are about this project with yours.
curl -O https://raw.githubusercontent.com/Othmane-Khadri/YALC-the-GTM-operating-system/main/.claude/skills/debugger/SKILL.mdgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Othmane-Khadri/YALC-the-GTM-operating-systemWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/othmane-khadri/yalc-the-gtm-operating-system/debugger)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/othmane-khadri/yalc-the-gtm-operating-system/debugger"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/othmane-khadri/yalc-the-gtm-operating-system/debugger/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/othmane-khadri/yalc-the-gtm-operating-system/debugger"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/othmane-khadri/yalc-the-gtm-operating-system/debugger.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 21 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 94 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 95 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 101 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 114 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 115 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 118 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 124 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 126 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 143 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 144 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 232 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 238 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 244 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 270 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 27 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 38 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium Rogue Agent · line 212 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 239 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 239 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 245 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00063 | $0.03694 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00032 | $0.01847 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00013 | $0.00739 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00006 | $0.00369 |
Grade B, and why
debugger scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Sends data to an external URLmediumData exfiltration
A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.
curl -s -w "\nHTTP_STATUS:%{http_code}" -H "Authorization: Bearer $FIRECRAWL_API_KEY" "https://api.firecrawl.dev/v1/scrape" -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"url":"https://example.com","formats":["markdow Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -s -w "\nHTTP_STATUS:%{http_code}" -H "X-API-KEY: $UNIPILE_API_KEY" "$UNIPILE_DSN/api/v1/accounts" 2>&1 | tail -5 How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 328 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
GTM-OS Debugger
Systematic diagnostic skill that activates when any GTM-OS command fails. Runs a 5-layer funnel from cheapest checks (file reads) to most expensive (live API calls), identifies the root cause, and offers auto-fixes with user approval.
When This Skill Applies
- Any
pnpm cli --command outputs an error or stack trace - User says "debug" / "fix" / "not working" / "broken" / "troubleshoot"
- User says "help me fix [error]" / "what went wrong" / "why is this failing"
- User pastes an error message or stack trace from GTM-OS
What This Skill Does NOT Do
- Fix bugs in user's custom code outside GTM-OS
- Debug network/firewall issues beyond basic connectivity checks
- Modify GTM-OS source code (only configuration, env vars, and database state)
CRITICAL RULES
- Never skip layers. Always start at Layer 1 even if you think you know the issue. Cheap checks catch 80% of problems.
- Never auto-fix without approval. Always show the proposed change and ask before applying.
- Never expose secrets. When reading
.env.localorapi_connections, mask all API keys (e.g.,sk-...redacted). - Short-circuit on first finding. When a layer finds the root cause, stop and offer the fix. Don't keep checking.
- Re-run the original command after fixing. The debug session isn't done until the command succeeds.
Base Context: GTM-OS Architecture
GTM-OS is a CLI-first TypeScript system for AI-native go-to-market automation.
Entry point: src/cli/index.ts via npx tsx
Env loading: .env.local via loadEnv() at CLI startup
Config files: ~/.gtm-os/config.yaml (user prefs) + gtm-os.yaml (GTM framework)
Database: SQLite via @libsql/client + Drizzle ORM. Default path: file:./gtm-os.db
Three-Layer Architecture
| Layer | Location | Purpose |
|---|---|---|
| Service | src/lib/services/ |
Singleton SDK wrappers (Unipile, Firecrawl, Notion). Lazy-init from env vars. |
| Provider | src/lib/providers/builtin/ |
StepExecutor implementations. Registry dispatches by capability. |
| Skill | src/lib/skills/ |
User-facing composable operations. |
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 328 lines · 63 tokens per session scan B 9ea09d445213
debugger is a skill published in the GitHub repository Othmane-Khadri/YALC-the-GTM-operating-system (300 stars, last pushed 21d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 63 tokens to every session and 3,694 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (sends data to an external url, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
kn-debug
Use when debugging errors, test failures, build issues, or blocked tasks — structured triage to fix to learn.
kn-doc
Use when working with Knowns documentation - viewing, searching, creating, or updating docs.
code_explorer
Explores the repository to locate primary source files, coupled UI components, and test files for bug reports or feature requests.
session-investigator
Investigate fast-agent session and history files to diagnose issues. Use when a session ended unexpectedly, when debugging tool loops, when correlating sub-agent traces with main sessions, or when analyzing conversation flow and timing. Covers session.json metadata, history JSON format, message structure, tool…
smiles-validation
Strict SMILES validation, structural comparison, and modification verification. Catches invalid LLM-generated molecules.
dd-triage-flaky-test
Load when investigating a specific flaky test. Gets history, failure pattern, and category, then recommends fix, quarantine, or escalate.