hunting-for-process-injection-techniques

hunting-for-process-injection-techniques is a skill for Claude Code from oyi77/1ai-skills. It costs 73 tokens per session (1,119 once invoked), scanned A, original, MIT.

A cybersecurity guide for finding process injection, an attack technique that puts malicious code inside another running program. It covers process hollowing, remote threads, and DLL injection.

In plain words
What is it for?
It is for threat hunting, incident investigation, detection-rule development, and checking for attacks that evade security tools.
Why use it?
Malware can hide behind a legitimate process, making it harder to identify by looking only at program names. The guide uses Windows and endpoint activity to reveal suspicious process relationships.

Skill for Claude Code

Written for Claude Code: shipped in a Claude Code plugin.

Part of the 1ai-skills plugin — 209 skills, 4 commands shipped together

Good fit It is for threat hunting, incident investigation, detection-rule development, and checking for attacks that evade security tools.

Compare 6 skills from other repositories ↓
Install with agentmods
npx agentmods add skills/oyi77/1ai-skills/hunting-for-process-injection-techniques
Install

Getting it into your agent

One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.

Any agent
npx skills add oyi77/1ai-skills --skill hunting-for-process-injection-techniques
Clone the repo
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/oyi77/1ai-skills

Made for: Claude Code.

Or install 1ai-skills, the plugin that ships this one along with the rest of its 209 skills, 4 commands.

Wrote this? Show the measurements

A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.

agentmods badge for hunting-for-process-injection-techniques

README.md
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Your own site
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/oyi77/1ai-skills/hunting-for-process-injection-techniques"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/oyi77/1ai-skills/hunting-for-process-injection-techniques/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>

Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.

agentmods 80×15 button for hunting-for-process-injection-techniques

Your own site · 80×15
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/oyi77/1ai-skills/hunting-for-process-injection-techniques"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/oyi77/1ai-skills/hunting-for-process-injection-techniques.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>
Per session 73 Skills are progressive disclosure: only the name and description are preloaded; the body loads when the skill is used.
When invoked 1,119 The whole file, excluding the scripts and references it only reads on demand.
Security scan A 0 findings. A grade says what 26 rules found in the file — not that it is safe. Third-party audits
  • NVIDIA SkillSpector pass 7 Sept 2026
How audits are shown
Origin original No closer match found in the catalogue.
Token cost

What it costs to keep this loaded

Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.

ModelPer sessionOnce invoked
Fable 5.1 $0.00073 $0.01119
Opus 5 $0.00036 $0.00560
Sonnet 5 $0.00015 $0.00224
Haiku 4.5 $0.00007 $0.00112

Measured 8d ago against content hash 48ce5ab71cf0, method: parsed. Prices are Anthropic first-party input rates as of 2026-09-12, from the pricing page.

Security

Grade A, and why

hunting-for-process-injection-techniques scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.

A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.

Nothing flagged

None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.

cybersecurity/_deprecated/hunting-for-process-injection-techniques/SKILL.md · 127 lines

How it starts

The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 127 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.

Hunting for Process Injection Techniques

Overview

Process injection (MITRE ATT&CK T1055) allows adversaries to execute code in the address space of another process, enabling defense evasion and privilege escalation. This skill detects injection techniques via Sysmon Event ID 8 (CreateRemoteThread), Event ID 10 (ProcessAccess with suspicious access rights), and analysis of source-target process relationships to distinguish legitimate from malicious injection.

When to Use

Trigger phrases:

  • "hunting for process injection techniques"

  • "Detect process injection techniques (T1055) including CreateRemoteThread, proces"

  • When investigating security incidents that require hunting for process injection techniques

  • When building detection rules or threat hunting queries for this domain

  • When SOC analysts need structured procedures for this analysis type

  • When validating security monitoring coverage for related attack techniques

When NOT to Use

  • When you lack proper authorization for testing
  • For production systems without change management
  • When the task requires legal or compliance expertise beyond technical scope

Prerequisites

  • Sysmon installed with Event IDs 8 and 10 enabled
  • Process creation logs (Sysmon Event ID 1 or Windows 4688)
  • Python 3.8+ with standard library
  • JSON-formatted Sysmon event logs

Steps

# Example: IOC detection
import re

IOC_PATTERNS = {
    "ip": r"\b(?:\d{1,3}\.){3}\d{1,3}\b",
    "domain": r"\b[a-z0-9-]+\.[a-z]{2,}\b",
    "hash_md5": r"\b[a-f0-9]{32}\b",
    "hash_sha256": r"\b[a-f0-9]{64}\b",
}

def extract_iocs(text: str) -> dict:
    return {k: re.findall(v, text) for k, v in IOC_PATTERNS.items()}
  1. Parse Sysmon Events — Ingest Event IDs 1, 8, and 10 from JSON log files
  2. Detect CreateRemoteThread — Flag Event ID 8 with suspicious source-target process pairs
  3. Analyze ProcessAccess Rights — Identify Event ID 10 with dangerous access masks (PROCESS_VM_WRITE, PROCESS_CREATE_THREAD)
  4. Build Process Relationship Graph — Map source-to-target injection relationships
  5. Filter Known Legitimate Pairs — Exclude known benign injection patterns (AV, debuggers, system processes)
  6. Score Injection Severity — Apply risk scoring based on source process, target process, and access rights
  7. Generate Hunt Report — Produce structured report with MITRE sub-technique mapping

Read the full file on GitHub · 127 lines

Changes

What this file has done since we first saw it

Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.

  1. 8d ago First seen · 127 lines · 73 tokens per session scan A 48ce5ab71cf0

Subscribe to this mod's changes

hunting-for-process-injection-techniques is a skill published in the GitHub repository oyi77/1ai-skills (12 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 73 tokens to every session and 1,119 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-04.

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