PentesterFlow is a terminal-based AI assistant for authorized penetration testing and bug hunting, guiding analysts through reconnaissance, testing, evidence gathering, and reporting while requiring human approval for sensitive actions. Security engineers use it with local or hosted language models and real security tools, and the catalogue add-ons extend its workflows.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add PentesterFlow/agent --skill takeovergit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/PentesterFlow/agentWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/pentesterflow/agent/takeover)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/pentesterflow/agent/takeover"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/pentesterflow/agent/takeover/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/pentesterflow/agent/takeover"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/pentesterflow/agent/takeover.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 2 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 44 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 143 Skill grants unrestricted tool access without appropriate constraints. An agent with unfettered tool access can perform arbitrary actions including file modification, network requests, and code execution.Fix: Restrict tool access to only the tools required for the skill's stated purpose. Use an explicit allowlist rather than granting blanket access.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00086 | $0.03522 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00034 | $0.01409 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00017 | $0.00704 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00352 |
Grade B, and why
takeover scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Unrestricted tool accessmediumExcessive agency
A wildcard tool grant or "run any command" leaves no least-privilege boundary at all.
- Run any script in the page. Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.target.example.com&output=json' \ How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 267 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Subdomain takeover playbook
A subdomain points (via CNAME, NS, or an A record on a shared host) at a
third-party service. The resource on that service was deleted, expired,
or never claimed — but the DNS record still exists. An attacker registers
the same resource on the provider and serves arbitrary content on the
victim's hostname. Severity is usually high to critical because
the takeover puts the attacker inside the victim's origin (cookie scope,
CSP allowlists, OAuth redirect_uri allowlists, SAML SP entity IDs,
email DKIM/SPF includes, ...).
Stay in scope. Only test takeovers against domains the program explicitly authorizes. A successful takeover is serving content on someone else's host — drop a benign HTML file (
takeover proof for <handle>, contact <email>) and stop.
Execution rule: operate on real subdomains and provider fingerprints from the scoped program. Never write literal placeholders such as <provider>, <handle>, or <email> to files; ask once for proof text if a provider requires a claim page.
1. Enumerate every subdomain
Use whatever recon you have. Curl-first sources you can hit without extra tooling:
# CT logs via crt.sh
curl -s 'https://crt.sh/?q=%25.target.example.com&output=json' \
| jq -r '.[].name_value' | sed 's/^\*\.//' | sort -u > subs.txt
# Anubis-DB
curl -s 'https://jldc.me/anubis/subdomains/target.example.com' \
| jq -r '.[]' >> subs.txt
# Hackertarget (rate-limited)
curl -s 'https://api.hackertarget.com/hostsearch/?q=target.example.com' \
| cut -d, -f1 >> subs.txt
sort -u subs.txt -o subs.txt
If [[recon]] is loaded, prefer those flows for the enumeration step.
2. Resolve each name — CNAME first, then A/AAAA
# Pull CNAMEs in one batch (works on macOS/Linux with dig)
while read -r sub; do
cname=$(dig +short CNAME "$sub" | head -n1)
if [ -n "$cname" ]; then printf '%s\tCNAME\t%s\n' "$sub" "$cname"; fi
done < subs.txt > resolved.tsv
# NS delegation (rare but high-severity)
while read -r sub; do
ns=$(dig +short NS "$sub")
if [ -n "$ns" ]; then printf '%s\tNS\t%s\n' "$sub" "$(echo "$ns" | tr '\n' ',')"; fi
done < subs.txt >> resolved.tsv
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 267 lines · 86 tokens per session scan B f569de0382d3
takeover is a skill published in the GitHub repository PentesterFlow/agent (1,448 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 86 tokens to every session and 3,522 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (unrestricted tool access, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
takeover compared with skills from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| takeoverPentesterFlow/agent | Skill | 1.4k | 2mo ago | Apache-2.0 | B | 86 | Claude Code |
| osint0dayInc/pwn | Skill | 86 | today | MIT | A | 21 | Claude Code |
| cwe0dayInc/pwn | Skill | 86 | today | MIT | A | 14 | Claude Code |
| penetration-testing0dayInc/pwn | Skill | 86 | today | MIT | A | 26 | Claude Code |
| pwn-ai-agent-curriculum0dayInc/pwn | Skill | 86 | today | MIT | A | 23 | Claude Code |
| pwn-ai-agent-loop0dayInc/pwn | Skill | 86 | today | MIT | A | 20 | Claude Code |
| pwn-ai-agent-reward0dayInc/pwn | Skill | 86 | today | MIT | A | 21 | Claude Code |