Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add PostOakLabs/ainumbers --skill seal-my-agent-loggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/PostOakLabs/ainumbersWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/postoaklabs/ainumbers/seal-my-agent-log)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/postoaklabs/ainumbers/seal-my-agent-log"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/postoaklabs/ainumbers/seal-my-agent-log/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/postoaklabs/ainumbers/seal-my-agent-log"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/postoaklabs/ainumbers/seal-my-agent-log.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00047 | $0.00553 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00019 | $0.00221 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00111 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00055 |
Grade A, and why
seal-my-agent-log scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 15d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
What it actually says
Seal my agent log
Take my agent gateway’s action log and seal it into a bundle anyone can verify offline.
Prompt
Turn a raw agent gateway action log into a sealed, offline-verifiable bundle.
- Export the gateway's action log for the window you care about (timestamp, actor, tool, input digest, output digest per line). Do not edit lines; gaps are findings, not noise.
- On your paired helmd, catalog.search for a pack that ingests an action log; if your deployment has one, note its workflow id. Otherwise use the generic evidence workflow.
- helmd workflow.run that workflow with the log as input. The run folds each line's digests into the pack's hash tree.
- helmd artifact.get the run: record execution_hash and the per-step digests.
- helmd artifact.verify the run against its manifest digest. State pass/fail and which steps are covered.
- helmd evidence.export the bundle. Confirm it carries: the log digests, the manifest digest, the execution_hash, and a verify command that needs no network.
- Give me the bundle path and a three-line handover note for your auditor: what the log covers, what the seal attests (digests, not behavior), and the exact offline command they run. Anyone with the bundle and helmd verifies it without contacting us. If a named tool is not in your tool list, call call_tool with { "name": "", "arguments": { … } }. It runs the same validation and returns the same receipt.
How to run
Connect an MCP-capable host to https://mcp.ainumbers.co/mcp, then give the prompt above to the assistant.
Use synthetic inputs only. Never paste personal or production data.
Verify what came back
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 15d ago Changed 352638716b2b
- 19d ago First seen · 39 lines · 47 tokens per session scan A 3a096020b70d
seal-my-agent-log is a skill published in the GitHub repository PostOakLabs/ainumbers (11 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 47 tokens to every session and 553 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-27.
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