Qwen Code is an open-source AI coding agent that runs in a terminal and helps developers work with code through language models. It supports multiple model providers and can also be used through IDEs, desktop software, SDKs, and messaging bots.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add QwenLM/qwen-code --skill find-simplificationsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/QwenLM/qwen-codeWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/qwenlm/qwen-code/find-simplifications)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/qwenlm/qwen-code/find-simplifications"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/qwenlm/qwen-code/find-simplifications/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/qwenlm/qwen-code/find-simplifications"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/qwenlm/qwen-code/find-simplifications.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 66 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 89 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high System Prompt Leakage · line 282 Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.Fix: Remove any instructions that reveal, print, or output system prompts or internal rules. System instructions should never be exposed to end users.
- medium Prompt Injection · line 45 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Prompt Injection · line 45 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Prompt Injection · line 49 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Prompt Injection · line 50 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Prompt Injection · line 53 Large whitespace padding was detected (a block of blank lines or a long run of spaces). This can push injected instructions below or to the right of the visible area so a human reviewer never sees them while the agent still reads them. Manual review of the hidden content is recommended.Fix: Remove the large whitespace padding (blank-line blocks or long space runs) and review any content hidden below or to the right of it. Keep skill files compact and reviewable so no instructions can be
- medium Memory Poisoning · line 81 Skill attempts to fill the context window with filler content, displacing legitimate instructions and safety constraints. This can degrade agent performance or bypass safety boundaries.Fix: Implement context-window management that detects and rejects padding or stuffing attempts. Prioritize system instructions over user-injected content.
- medium Memory Poisoning · line 83 Skill attempts to fill the context window with filler content, displacing legitimate instructions and safety constraints. This can degrade agent performance or bypass safety boundaries.Fix: Implement context-window management that detects and rejects padding or stuffing attempts. Prioritize system instructions over user-injected content.
- medium Memory Poisoning · line 84 Skill attempts to fill the context window with filler content, displacing legitimate instructions and safety constraints. This can degrade agent performance or bypass safety boundaries.Fix: Implement context-window management that detects and rejects padding or stuffing attempts. Prioritize system instructions over user-injected content.
- medium Memory Poisoning · line 85 Skill attempts to fill the context window with filler content, displacing legitimate instructions and safety constraints. This can degrade agent performance or bypass safety boundaries.Fix: Implement context-window management that detects and rejects padding or stuffing attempts. Prioritize system instructions over user-injected content.
- medium Memory Poisoning · line 87 Skill attempts to fill the context window with filler content, displacing legitimate instructions and safety constraints. This can degrade agent performance or bypass safety boundaries.Fix: Implement context-window management that detects and rejects padding or stuffing attempts. Prioritize system instructions over user-injected content.
- medium Memory Poisoning · line 88 Skill attempts to fill the context window with filler content, displacing legitimate instructions and safety constraints. This can degrade agent performance or bypass safety boundaries.Fix: Implement context-window management that detects and rejects padding or stuffing attempts. Prioritize system instructions over user-injected content.
- medium Memory Poisoning · line 89 Skill attempts to fill the context window with filler content, displacing legitimate instructions and safety constraints. This can degrade agent performance or bypass safety boundaries.Fix: Implement context-window management that detects and rejects padding or stuffing attempts. Prioritize system instructions over user-injected content.
- medium Memory Poisoning · line 90 Skill attempts to fill the context window with filler content, displacing legitimate instructions and safety constraints. This can degrade agent performance or bypass safety boundaries.Fix: Implement context-window management that detects and rejects padding or stuffing attempts. Prioritize system instructions over user-injected content.
- medium Memory Poisoning · line 91 Skill attempts to fill the context window with filler content, displacing legitimate instructions and safety constraints. This can degrade agent performance or bypass safety boundaries.Fix: Implement context-window management that detects and rejects padding or stuffing attempts. Prioritize system instructions over user-injected content.
- medium Memory Poisoning · line 92 Skill attempts to fill the context window with filler content, displacing legitimate instructions and safety constraints. This can degrade agent performance or bypass safety boundaries.Fix: Implement context-window management that detects and rejects padding or stuffing attempts. Prioritize system instructions over user-injected content.
- medium Memory Poisoning · line 93 Skill attempts to fill the context window with filler content, displacing legitimate instructions and safety constraints. This can degrade agent performance or bypass safety boundaries.Fix: Implement context-window management that detects and rejects padding or stuffing attempts. Prioritize system instructions over user-injected content.
- medium Memory Poisoning · line 94 Skill attempts to fill the context window with filler content, displacing legitimate instructions and safety constraints. This can degrade agent performance or bypass safety boundaries.Fix: Implement context-window management that detects and rejects padding or stuffing attempts. Prioritize system instructions over user-injected content.
- medium Memory Poisoning · line 95 Skill attempts to fill the context window with filler content, displacing legitimate instructions and safety constraints. This can degrade agent performance or bypass safety boundaries.Fix: Implement context-window management that detects and rejects padding or stuffing attempts. Prioritize system instructions over user-injected content.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00103 | $0.05943 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00041 | $0.02377 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00021 | $0.01189 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00594 |
Grade C, and why
find-simplifications scanned grade C with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 24d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Recursive force deletehighDestructive command
rm -rf with a variable or a broad path is one typo away from removing the wrong tree.
# work included. rm -rf unlinks a symlink without following it; prune Runs shell commandslowCapability
Expected in a hook, worth knowing in a rule or an instructions file.
function that does not exist under `/bin/sh`, so a `node execSync('rg …')` How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 368 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Finding qwen-code Simplifications
AGENTS.md § Simplicity First — "Minimum code that solves the problem.
Nothing speculative." This skill hunts what that principle already rejected
but that shipped anyway. It owns correct code nobody needs, repo-wide,
with no diff to anchor on.
Every candidate names the surface, names every consumer, and says what breaks when it goes. A candidate whose consumers cannot all be named is dropped — not downgraded, dropped.
Read this file, then the one document for your phase. Do not survey or land from this file alone; if the phase document cannot be read, stop and say so.
| Phase | Document |
|---|---|
| Survey (default): find and file | references/survey.md |
| Land: turn ONE approved candidate into a PR | references/land.md |
Issue First, PR Second
A run's deliverable is a comment on the tracking issue, not a PR.
Survey → file candidates on the tracking issue → maintainer says yes to one
→ land that one → one PR, one candidate.
This is not ceremony. AGENTS.md § Core Infrastructure ends "When in doubt,
escalate. Better to wrongly escalate than to wrongly approve," and an
unrequested batch of deletions is the shape that gets closed. It also makes
the ledger free: the issue that carries the proposals is the same object the
next run reads to avoid re-proposing them.
A maintainer asking for a PR in this session counts as assent — record it on the ledger before opening the PR.
Boundaries
| Skill | Owns | Why not this one |
|---|---|---|
bundled /simplify |
The diff you just wrote; stops when there is no diff | Cannot see surface accumulated across releases |
/repo-hygiene |
Wrong code — a defect provable by evidence; bans "cleaner / more modern / more consistent" edits | Its six angles are all defect classes |
bundled /review |
Judging a change that exists | Your change does not exist yet |
/create-issue |
Filing an issue well | Use it to create the ledger issue when missing — it cannot comment; post run comments with gh issue comment |
/prepare-pr |
pr-title.txt / pr-body.md from the repo template |
Call it in the land phase; do not reinvent PR rules |
/verify-pr |
Behavioral A/B evidence for a PR | A deletion has no behavior to demo |
/bugfix, /feat-dev, /deflake, /docs-* |
A defect, a feature, a flaky test, prose | None of them remove surface |
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 24d ago Changed 01b412cd50b5
- 1mo ago Changed d870931e2752
- 1mo ago Changed · -2 lines 64dda0b3cf42
- 1mo ago First seen · 370 lines · 103 tokens per session scan C a0dd4efa448f
find-simplifications is a skill published in the GitHub repository QwenLM/qwen-code (28,586 stars, last pushed today), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 103 tokens to every session and 5,943 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it C with 2 findings (recursive force delete, runs shell commands). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
agentic-code-review
Use when reviewing a diff, pull request, branch, or AI-generated code for correctness, security, regression, test, performance, and maintainability risks before merge.
repo-health-check
Use when auditing a repo before changes to find the smallest safe PR, quality risks, stale docs, missing tests, ignored-file gaps, or agent setup issues. Best first skill for unfamiliar codebases.
gh-find-prs
Survey open Codewhale PRs and triage each for mergeability and disposition against the real landing branch.
review
Diff-scoped correctness review that reads the codebase around the change — callers, contracts, and invariants — and returns line-anchored findings ranked by severity with confidence, then a merge-risk verdict. Use for reviewing a PR, diff, or named change set. Not for style review, approvals-as-rubber-stamp, or…
simplify
Improve clarity and reduce needless complexity after behavior is understood; preserve behavior and keep cleanup separate from correctness fixes.
include-test-files-that-assert-on-behavior-being-changed-in-decl
When delegating a task affected by this skill, include.