Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add RedHatProductSecurity/prodsec-skills --skill container-hardeninggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/RedHatProductSecurity/prodsec-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/redhatproductsecurity/prodsec-skills/container-hardening)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/redhatproductsecurity/prodsec-skills/container-hardening"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/redhatproductsecurity/prodsec-skills/container-hardening/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/redhatproductsecurity/prodsec-skills/container-hardening"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/redhatproductsecurity/prodsec-skills/container-hardening.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 1 finding, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 48 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00036 | $0.02388 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00018 | $0.01194 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00007 | $0.00478 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00239 |
Grade A, and why
container-hardening scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootlowPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
Containers must not run as root. Set `runAsNonRoot: true` and provide a numeric non-root `USER` in the Containerfile. Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 242 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Container Hardening
Secure container images and runtime configuration to reduce attack surface, prevent privilege escalation, and ensure compliance with Kubernetes security best practices.
Base Image Selection
- Use a Universal Base Image (UBI) from the official Red Hat Container Registry
- Prefer ubi-minimal (
ubi8/ubi-minimalorubi9/ubi-minimal) to reduce attack surface - Use the most up-to-date image available
Required for: all profiles (mandatory)
Image Tagging Strategy
| Source | Strategy |
|---|---|
| Red Hat Catalog | Omit floating tags to get the latest image; exception: Konflux project uses digest-based pinning with automated updates |
| Non-Red Hat registries | Pin the version or digest to ensure you use the intended image and not a tampered one |
Minimize Installed Software
Remove non-essential packages and clean up package manager caches:
RUN microdnf upgrade -y && \
microdnf install -y <required-packages> && \
microdnf remove -y <unnecessary-packages> && \
microdnf clean all
Use microdnf on ubi-minimal images; dnf on full UBI images.
Runtime Security
Non-Root Execution
Containers must not run as root. Set runAsNonRoot: true and provide a numeric non-root USER in the Containerfile.
Required for: all profiles (mandatory)
USER 1000
securityContext:
runAsNonRoot: true
runAsUser: 1000
Either the pod-level or container-level securityContext can set these fields. Do not use UID 0 (root) or UID 1337 (reserved for Istio sidecar proxies).
Required for: Extended (mandatory), all others (optional) — UID 1337 restriction
Privilege Restrictions
Set allowPrivilegeEscalation: false to prevent privilege escalation during container execution:
Required for: all profiles (mandatory)
securityContext:
allowPrivilegeEscalation: false
Or in a compose file:
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 242 lines · 36 tokens per session scan A 0047245be67e
container-hardening is a skill published in the GitHub repository RedHatProductSecurity/prodsec-skills (52 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 36 tokens to every session and 2,388 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (asks for root). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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compute-env-setup
Set up a reproducible Feynman compute environment for research jobs. Use when a task needs Python/R packages, GPU libraries, containers, Modal, SSH, caches, or managed model runtime setup.
securing-kubernetes-on-cloud
This skill covers hardening managed Kubernetes clusters on EKS, AKS, and GKE by implementing Pod Security Standards, network policies, workload identity, RBAC scoping, image admission controls, and runtime security monitoring. It addresses cloud-specific security features including IRSA for EKS, Workload Identity for…
detecting-privilege-escalation-in-kubernetes-pods
Detect and prevent privilege escalation in Kubernetes pods by monitoring security contexts, capabilities, and syscall patterns with Falco and OPA policies.
implementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes
Harden Kubernetes Role-Based Access Control by implementing least-privilege policies, auditing role bindings, eliminating cluster-admin sprawl, and integrating external identity providers.
docker-socket-mount
Docker / containerd socket mounted into a container → host RCE. Common in CI runners, GitOps controllers (ArgoCD, Flux), and 'Docker-in-Docker' setups. Single-command escape via docker run --rm --privileged -v /:/host alpine chroot /host.