Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add SalesforceCommerceCloud/b2c-developer-tooling --skill b2c-slas-auth-patternsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/SalesforceCommerceCloud/b2c-developer-toolingWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/salesforcecommercecloud/b2c-developer-tooling/b2c-slas-auth-patterns)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/salesforcecommercecloud/b2c-developer-tooling/b2c-slas-auth-patterns"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/salesforcecommercecloud/b2c-developer-tooling/b2c-slas-auth-patterns/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/salesforcecommercecloud/b2c-developer-tooling/b2c-slas-auth-patterns"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/salesforcecommercecloud/b2c-developer-tooling/b2c-slas-auth-patterns.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 7 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 406 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 63 Request target host is built from a dynamic or untrusted value. If the host is attacker-influenced, this enables SSRF to arbitrary internal or metadata endpoints.Fix: Do not build request URLs from untrusted input. Validate the host against an allowlist and reject internal/metadata addresses before issuing the request.
- medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 118 Request target host is built from a dynamic or untrusted value. If the host is attacker-influenced, this enables SSRF to arbitrary internal or metadata endpoints.Fix: Do not build request URLs from untrusted input. Validate the host against an allowlist and reject internal/metadata addresses before issuing the request.
- medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 224 Request target host is built from a dynamic or untrusted value. If the host is attacker-influenced, this enables SSRF to arbitrary internal or metadata endpoints.Fix: Do not build request URLs from untrusted input. Validate the host against an allowlist and reject internal/metadata addresses before issuing the request.
- medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 249 Request target host is built from a dynamic or untrusted value. If the host is attacker-influenced, this enables SSRF to arbitrary internal or metadata endpoints.Fix: Do not build request URLs from untrusted input. Validate the host against an allowlist and reject internal/metadata addresses before issuing the request.
- medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 286 Request target host is built from a dynamic or untrusted value. If the host is attacker-influenced, this enables SSRF to arbitrary internal or metadata endpoints.Fix: Do not build request URLs from untrusted input. Validate the host against an allowlist and reject internal/metadata addresses before issuing the request.
- medium Server-Side Request Forgery · line 351 Request target host is built from a dynamic or untrusted value. If the host is attacker-influenced, this enables SSRF to arbitrary internal or metadata endpoints.Fix: Do not build request URLs from untrusted input. Validate the host against an allowlist and reject internal/metadata addresses before issuing the request.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00135 | $0.03559 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00054 | $0.01424 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00027 | $0.00712 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00014 | $0.00356 |
Grade A, and why
b2c-slas-auth-patterns scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 421 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
B2C SLAS Authentication Patterns
Advanced authentication patterns for SLAS (Shopper Login and API Access Service) beyond basic login. These patterns enable passwordless authentication, hybrid storefront support, and system-to-system integration.
Scope & grounding
This skill covers SLAS authentication patterns including passwordless login (email OTP, SMS, passkeys), session bridging, hybrid authentication (B2C 25.3+), token management, TSOB, and JWT validation with framework-specific examples for PWA Kit, Storefront Next, and SFRA. Code examples are illustrative of typical flows. Before answering version-specific questions, framework-specific implementations, or providing code the user will run in production, confirm current API contracts, parameters, rate limits, and version requirements against the official documentation via b2c docs search and b2c docs read. The canonical docs are the authoritative source for B2C platform specifics, API shapes, and configuration requirements.
Canonical docs
commerce-api/slas- SLAS overviewcommerce-api/slas-best-practices- Security and implementation best practicescommerce-api/slas-passwordless-login-overview- Passwordless authentication overviewcommerce-api/slas-passwordless-login-email- Email OTP implementationcommerce-api/slas-passwordless-login-passkey- Passkey/WebAuthn implementationcommerce-api/slas-passwordless-sms- SMS OTP implementationcommerce-api/slas-session-bridge-overview- Session bridge overviewcommerce-api/slas-session-bridge-auth- Session bridge implementationcommerce-api/hybrid-authentication- Hybrid authentication (B2C 25.3+)commerce-api/hybrid-auth-pwa-kit-v2- PWA Kit v2 hybrid authpwa-kit-managed-runtime/hybrid-auth- PWA Kit managed runtime hybrid authpwa-kit-managed-runtime/plugin-slas-setup- Plugin SLAS setupcommerce-api/slas-trusted-system- Trusted system on behalf (TSOB)commerce-api/slas-public-client- Public client configurationcommerce-api/slas-private-client- Private client configurationcommerce-api/slas-validate-jwt-with-jwks- JWT validation
What ships with it
4 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 421 lines · 135 tokens per session scan A 21b7df8c751c
b2c-slas-auth-patterns is a skill published in the GitHub repository SalesforceCommerceCloud/b2c-developer-tooling (56 stars, last pushed today), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 135 tokens to every session and 3,559 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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