alwaysai-setup

These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →

• medium Privilege Escalation · line 29
  Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
  Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
• medium Privilege Escalation · line 63
  Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
  Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
• medium MCP Rug Pull · line 68
  Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.
  Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
• medium Rogue Agent · line 136
  Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
  Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
• medium Privilege Escalation · line 135
  Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
  Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
• medium Privilege Escalation · line 136
  Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
  Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.