polymarket-copytrading

These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →

• high YARA Match · line 224
  YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).
  Fix: Remove the malware payload or compromised file entirely. Investigate how it entered the skill and audit all other artifacts for additional indicators of compromise.
• medium Data Exfiltration · line 132
  Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
  Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
• medium Data Exfiltration · line 132
  Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
  Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
• medium Data Exfiltration · line 192
  Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
  Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
• medium Rogue Agent · line 244
  Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.
  Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.