Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Terryc21/radar-suite --skill capstone-radargit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Terryc21/radar-suiteWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/terryc21/radar-suite/capstone-radar)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/terryc21/radar-suite/capstone-radar"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/terryc21/radar-suite/capstone-radar/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/terryc21/radar-suite/capstone-radar"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/terryc21/radar-suite/capstone-radar.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 11 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high System Prompt Leakage · line 127 Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.Fix: Remove any instructions that reveal, print, or output system prompts or internal rules. System instructions should never be exposed to end users.
- high System Prompt Leakage · line 145 Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.Fix: Remove any instructions that reveal, print, or output system prompts or internal rules. System instructions should never be exposed to end users.
- high System Prompt Leakage · line 187 Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.Fix: Remove any instructions that reveal, print, or output system prompts or internal rules. System instructions should never be exposed to end users.
- high System Prompt Leakage · line 187 Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.Fix: Remove any instructions that reveal, print, or output system prompts or internal rules. System instructions should never be exposed to end users.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 200 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 653 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 1133 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 1136 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 1163 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 1164 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 1165 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00091 | $0.14461 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00036 | $0.05784 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00018 | $0.02892 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.01446 |
Grade A, and why
capstone-radar scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 1,257 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Capstone Radar
Capstone Radar is the aggregator + gap filler for the 6-skill radar family (5 companions + capstone). It consumes findings from 5 companion skills, runs its own scans for 5 domains the companions don't cover, grades everything on one unified scale, and makes the ship/no-ship decision.
It does NOT:
- Re-scan domains already covered by companion skills
- Dispatch Axiom auditor agents
- Produce separate reports for domains companions already cover
Usage
| Command | Description |
|---|---|
/capstone-radar |
Full analysis — checks everything and reads companion handoffs |
/capstone-radar quick |
Quick check — own domains only, ignores companion results |
/capstone-radar report |
No scanning, re-grade from existing handoff files only |
/capstone-radar diff |
Compare against previous audit — show resolved/new issues |
--trust-all |
Override staleness decay -- treat all companion handoffs as Fresh |
--show-suppressed |
Show findings suppressed by known-intentional entries |
Diff Command
Audit comparison — compare current codebase against a previous audit to show what changed.
Usage
/capstone-radar diff
/capstone-radar diff 2026-03-15
How It Works
- Find previous audit — Read the most recent (or specified date)
.agents/research/*-capstone-audit.md - Parse previous findings — Extract all issues from the GRADES_YAML block and findings tables
- Re-check each finding:
- Read the file at the reported line number
- Check if the problematic pattern still exists
- Classify as: ✅ RESOLVED, 🔴 STILL OPEN, 📁 FILE CHANGED
- Scan for new issues — Quick grep scan for new violations not in previous report
- Output diff summary
Output Format
Audit Diff: 2026-03-15 → 2026-03-29
Summary:
✅ Resolved: 8 issues fixed since last audit
🔴 Still Open: 3 issues remain
🆕 New: 2 new issues detected
📁 Changed: 4 files modified (may need re-verification)
Grade Trend:
Overall: B [83] → B+ [87] ↑
Code Hygiene: B- → A- ↑
Security Basics: A → A (stable)
Test Health: C → C+ ↑
Resolved Issues:
| # | Finding | Was | File | Resolved By |
|---|---------|-----|------|-------------|
| 1 | TODO marker in production | 🟡 HIGH | CloudSyncManager.swift:142 | Commit abc123 |
Still Open:
| # | Finding | Urgency | File | Age |
|---|---------|---------|------|-----|
| 1 | Force unwrap in error path | 🟡 HIGH | BackupManager.swift:89 | 14 days |
New Issues:
| # | Finding | Urgency | Risk: Fix | Risk: No Fix | ROI | Blast Radius | Fix Effort | Status |
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago First seen · 1,257 lines · 91 tokens per session scan A 8892174392fa
capstone-radar is a skill published in the GitHub repository Terryc21/radar-suite (20 stars, last pushed 5d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 91 tokens to every session and 14,461 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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