Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add Terryc21/radar-suite --skill time-bomb-radargit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/Terryc21/radar-suiteWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/terryc21/radar-suite/time-bomb-radar)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/terryc21/radar-suite/time-bomb-radar"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/terryc21/radar-suite/time-bomb-radar/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/terryc21/radar-suite/time-bomb-radar"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/terryc21/radar-suite/time-bomb-radar.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 5 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high System Prompt Leakage · line 50 Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.Fix: Remove any instructions that reveal, print, or output system prompts or internal rules. System instructions should never be exposed to end users.
- high System Prompt Leakage · line 120 Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.Fix: Remove any instructions that reveal, print, or output system prompts or internal rules. System instructions should never be exposed to end users.
- high System Prompt Leakage · line 133 Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.Fix: Remove any instructions that reveal, print, or output system prompts or internal rules. System instructions should never be exposed to end users.
- high System Prompt Leakage · line 133 Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.Fix: Remove any instructions that reveal, print, or output system prompts or internal rules. System instructions should never be exposed to end users.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 75 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00080 | $0.11004 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00040 | $0.05502 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00016 | $0.02201 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.01100 |
Grade A, and why
time-bomb-radar scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 825 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Time Bomb Radar
Finds code that works today but crashes after the data gets old enough.
Time bombs are deferred operations that pass every test, every code review, every pattern matcher, then crash your app weeks or months after release. The trigger is data age + environment state, not code paths. They produce 1-star reviews from your most loyal users -- the ones who kept the app long enough for the timer to fire.
Origin: A production-class crash where SafeDeletionManager archived items for 30 days, then cascade-deleted them, triggering a SwiftData _FullFutureBackingData fatal error on unresolved iCloud .externalStorage faults. The bug was invisible during development because no test data was 30 days old. If shipped, every user would have crashed on day 31.
Quick commands
| Command | What it does |
|---|---|
/time-bomb-radar |
Full audit across all 7 patterns |
/time-bomb-radar deferred-deletes |
Pattern 1 only -- cascade deletes on aged data |
/time-bomb-radar cache-expiry |
Pattern 2 only -- cache purge with model relationships |
/time-bomb-radar trial-expiry |
Pattern 3 only -- subscription/trial expiry paths |
/time-bomb-radar background-tasks |
Pattern 4 only -- accumulated background work |
/time-bomb-radar date-transitions |
Pattern 5 only -- date-threshold state changes |
/time-bomb-radar scheduled-side-effects |
Pattern 6 only -- notifications/reminders scheduled from aged data |
/time-bomb-radar cascade-live-refs |
Pattern 7 only -- cascade delete with live child references |
--show-suppressed |
Show findings suppressed by known-intentional entries (see § Intentional Suppression Flags) |
--accept-intentional |
Mark current finding as known-intentional (see § Intentional Suppression Flags) |
Intentional Suppression Flags
Both flags wrap the protocol in radar-suite-core.md § Known-Intentional Suppression, which owns the canonical spec for .radar-suite/known-intentional.yaml (file format, fields, matching rules).
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 825 lines · 80 tokens per session scan A c85c7b4abe25
time-bomb-radar is a skill published in the GitHub repository Terryc21/radar-suite (20 stars, last pushed 11d ago), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 80 tokens to every session and 11,004 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
workflow-audit
Systematic UI workflow auditing for SwiftUI applications. Discovers entry points, traces user flows, detects dead ends and broken promises, audits data wiring, evaluates from user perspective. Triggers: "workflow audit", "audit flows", "find dead ends", "check navigation".
plan
Epic decomposition into trackable, right-sized tasks. Three modes — audit-aware (codebase-audit reports), workflow-audit-aware (handoff.yaml with pre-rated findings), standalone (from scratch). Light convention scanning for projects without CLAUDE.md.
ttb-skill-audit
Code audits for TTBaseUIKit apps: performance, accessibility, localization. FCR compliance scoring.
rust-intel
Hard rules for writing Rust in code that already compiles and passes tests but is silently broken, slow, or semver-fragile. Load this BEFORE writing any Rust code. Targets bugs that survive rustc, clippy, and cargo test but fail in production or rot the codebase. Covers async, unsafe, FFI, concurrency, crypto…
swift-review
Review Swift/iOS code: SwiftUI, Combine, UIKit, App Store guidelines and iOS architecture.
rust-intel
Hard rules for writing Rust in code that already compiles and passes tests but is silently broken, slow, or semver-fragile. Load this BEFORE writing any Rust code. Targets bugs that survive rustc, clippy, and cargo test but fail in production or rot the codebase. Covers async, unsafe, FFI, concurrency, crypto…