Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add The-17/agentsecrets --skill openclawgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/The-17/agentsecretsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/the-17/agentsecrets/openclaw)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/the-17/agentsecrets/openclaw"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/the-17/agentsecrets/openclaw/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/the-17/agentsecrets/openclaw"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/the-17/agentsecrets/openclaw.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 2 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 22 npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.Fix: Pin the version: npx @scope/[email protected]
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 74 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00021 | $0.01448 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00579 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00290 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00145 |
Grade A, and why
agentsecrets scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 1mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
Instead of using `curl`, always use the `call` proxy. The proxy injects the secret securely: How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 127 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
AgentSecrets — Zero-Knowledge Secrets Infrastructure
You manage the full credentials lifecycle autonomously using the agentsecrets CLI or Model Context Protocol (MCP) server.
You are the operator. You never see the actual credential values.
Security & Privacy Rules (with Native Mitigations)
[!WARNING] Outbound Data Exfiltration Risk & Allowlist Mitigation: Although you can autonomously trigger API calls through the proxy, AgentSecrets strictly mitigates exfiltration risks via the Workspace Domain Allowlist. Outbound requests are blocked by default unless the destination domain is explicitly authorized. Only workspace administrators can alter the allowlist (which requires local password verification).
Rogue credential modification & Password Mitigation: Unsupervised scripts or agents are prevented from tampering with critical environments. Creating, modifying, or deleting secrets in the
productionenvironment (or globally across all environments) requires Local Password Verification.Plaintext Exposure & Zero-Knowledge Enforcement: You must never attempt to retrieve or display plaintext credential values. The
agentsecrets secrets getcommand is strictly restricted for agents. OS Keychain storage is further isolated by thekeychain-authdaemon's Process Hash Verification to prevent process hijacking.Outbound Request Auditing: All outbound requests and enforcement outcomes are automatically recorded in the local SQLite database (
~/.agentsecrets/audit.db). The forensic log is cryptographically chain-hashed (chain_hash = sha256(prev_id + current_id + created_at)) to guarantee log immutability and non-repudiation.
Core Workflow Commands
Always start by verifying context:
agentsecrets status # Shows workspace, project, environment
agentsecrets secrets list # Lists available keys
If not initialized or logged out, tell the user to run agentsecrets login. For new projects, run agentsecrets init --storage-mode 1.
What ships with it
3 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 1mo ago Changed f4f3e89e178d
- 1mo ago First seen · 127 lines · 21 tokens per session scan A 33361ace4fbe
agentsecrets is a skill published in the GitHub repository The-17/agentsecrets (190 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 21 tokens to every session and 1,448 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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