Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add tikoci/routeros-skills --skill routeros-command-treegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/tikoci/routeros-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/tikoci/routeros-skills/routeros-command-tree)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/tikoci/routeros-skills/routeros-command-tree"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/tikoci/routeros-skills/routeros-command-tree/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/tikoci/routeros-skills/routeros-command-tree"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/tikoci/routeros-skills/routeros-command-tree.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 215 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 220 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
- medium Rogue Agent · line 224 Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.Fix: Remove any persistence mechanisms (cron jobs, startup scripts, state files). Skills should not maintain state across sessions without explicit user consent.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00079 | $0.03191 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00039 | $0.01596 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00016 | $0.00638 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00319 |
Grade A, and why
routeros-command-tree scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 346 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
RouterOS Command Tree & /console/inspect
Overview
RouterOS organizes all configuration and commands in a hierarchical tree. Every path in the CLI
(like /ip/address/add) corresponds to a node in this tree. The /console/inspect REST endpoint
lets you programmatically explore the entire tree — this is how tools like restraml (RAML/OpenAPI
schema generator) and rosetta (MCP command lookup) build their databases.
The Command Tree Structure
RouterOS's command hierarchy has four node types:
| Node Type | Meaning | Example |
|---|---|---|
dir |
Directory — contains child paths | /ip, /system |
path |
Path — a navigable level (often has commands) | /ip/address, /interface/bridge |
cmd |
Command — an executable action | add, set, print, remove, get, export |
arg |
Argument — a parameter to a command | address=, interface=, disabled= |
Tree Example
/ (root dir)
├── ip/ (dir)
│ ├── address/ (path)
│ │ ├── add (cmd)
│ │ │ ├── address (arg) — "IP address"
│ │ │ ├── interface (arg) — "Interface name"
│ │ │ └── disabled (arg) — "yes | no"
│ │ ├── set (cmd)
│ │ ├── remove (cmd)
│ │ ├── get (cmd)
│ │ ├── print (cmd)
│ │ └── export (cmd)
│ ├── route/ (path)
│ │ └── ...
│ └── dns/ (path)
│ ├── set (cmd)
│ ├── cache/ (path)
│ │ ├── print (cmd)
│ │ └── flush (cmd)
│ └── ...
├── interface/ (dir)
│ └── ...
├── system/ (dir)
│ └── ...
└── ...
/console/inspect API
Endpoint
POST /rest/console/inspect
Requires basic authentication. Available on all RouterOS 7.x versions.
Request Types
| Request | Purpose | Returns |
|---|---|---|
child |
List children of a path | Array of {type: "child", name, "node-type"} |
syntax |
Get help text for a node | Array of {type: "syntax", text} |
highlight |
Syntax highlighting data | Per-byte token classes — see the routeros-syntax-inspection skill |
completion |
Tab-completion suggestions | Completion candidates — see routeros-syntax-inspection for validity checking |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 346 lines · 79 tokens per session scan A 84204e9d7372
routeros-command-tree is a skill published in the GitHub repository tikoci/routeros-skills (58 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 79 tokens to every session and 3,191 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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