Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add tobihagemann/turbo --skill codex-execgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/tobihagemann/turboWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/tobihagemann/turbo/codex-exec)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/tobihagemann/turbo/codex-exec"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/tobihagemann/turbo/codex-exec/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/tobihagemann/turbo/codex-exec"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/tobihagemann/turbo/codex-exec.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 5 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Excessive Agency · line 11 Skill selects an external model or provider that may use a different account or billing plan than the operator expects. Undisclosed model switches can cause unexpected cost or quota consumption.Fix: Remove the model/provider override or disclose it prominently and require explicit operator approval before invoking an external coding CLI or billed model.
- high Excessive Agency · line 37 Skill selects an external model or provider that may use a different account or billing plan than the operator expects. Undisclosed model switches can cause unexpected cost or quota consumption.Fix: Remove the model/provider override or disclose it prominently and require explicit operator approval before invoking an external coding CLI or billed model.
- high Excessive Agency · line 55 Skill selects an external model or provider that may use a different account or billing plan than the operator expects. Undisclosed model switches can cause unexpected cost or quota consumption.Fix: Remove the model/provider override or disclose it prominently and require explicit operator approval before invoking an external coding CLI or billed model.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 80 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 87 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00047 | $0.02244 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00019 | $0.00898 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00449 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00005 | $0.00224 |
Grade A, and why
codex-exec scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 15d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 118 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Codex Exec
Autonomous task execution via the codex CLI. Runs non-interactively. Progress streams to stderr; final result on stdout.
codex exec --skip-git-repo-check "task description" < /dev/null
For large context, pipe it via stdin. The prompt stays as the argument, context is passed as <stdin> automatically:
cat context.txt | codex exec --skip-git-repo-check "question about the context"
Route text you did not author through this channel whatever its size — a diff, file contents, a code comment, a plan or spec, third-party feedback, command output. Write the context file with the Write tool so nothing is interpreted on the way in. Keep backticks, $, and straight double quotes out of the quoted argument even in text you wrote: the first two stay live inside it, and a double quote ends it. When the prompt itself must carry any of them, as when it quotes a title or a passage, write the whole prompt and its context to one file with the Write tool and pass -, so stdin is the entire prompt:
cat prompt.txt | codex exec --skip-git-repo-check -
Sandbox
All codex Bash calls require dangerouslyDisableSandbox: true (network access to OpenAI API). Without it, codex crashes with an Operation not permitted panic from the system-configuration crate before the model runs.
Git Repository Check
Every codex exec invocation requires --skip-git-repo-check, resume turns included. Outside a git repository codex aborts before doing any work, printing Not inside a trusted directory and --skip-git-repo-check was not specified., and never writes the -o file.
Stdin Gotcha
Codex reads from stdin whenever stdin is non-TTY (per codex exec --help: "If stdin is piped and a prompt is also provided, stdin is appended as a <stdin> block"). In subagent and subprocess contexts the harness leaves stdin connected to a pipe that never EOFs, so a bare codex exec "..." hangs forever, printing only Reading additional input from stdin....
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 15d ago Changed 2964251dab5b
- 20d ago Changed ec5d438281fb
- 1mo ago Changed · +4 lines 78a6cae5885c
- 1mo ago Changed · -8 lines fd7b0cb7fff4
- 1mo ago Changed · +4 lines c2bd93f49ba3
- 1mo ago Changed · +5 lines e104cf903ed4
- 1mo ago First seen · 113 lines · 47 tokens per session scan A bfde2f4b6827
codex-exec is a skill published in the GitHub repository tobihagemann/turbo (417 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed MIT. It adds 47 tokens to every session and 2,244 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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