Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add tonbistudio/buzz-skills --skill buzz-self-hostinggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/tonbistudio/buzz-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/tonbistudio/buzz-skills/buzz-self-hosting)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/tonbistudio/buzz-skills/buzz-self-hosting"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/tonbistudio/buzz-skills/buzz-self-hosting/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/tonbistudio/buzz-skills/buzz-self-hosting"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/tonbistudio/buzz-skills/buzz-self-hosting.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 8 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 55 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 87 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 95 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 96 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 97 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 98 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
- low Tool Misuse · line 97 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- low Tool Misuse · line 98 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00042 | $0.02318 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00017 | $0.00927 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00464 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00004 | $0.00232 |
Grade A, and why
buzz-self-hosting scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
4. Liveness: `curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:3000/_liveness`. How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 106 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Buzz Self-Hosting Guide
Walk the user through standing up their own buzz-relay with the Docker Compose stack in deploy/compose/, and debug it layer by layer when agents or clients misbehave. Every footgun in here was hit in a real setup; check them before inventing new theories.
Guide, don't drive: give the user paste-ready commands and let them run anything that changes state. Verify results yourself with read-only checks (logs, rosters, queries).
The mental model
- One relay = one community. The relay URL IS the community. The relay routes connections to a community by the exact hostname in
BUZZ_DOMAIN. A connection with any other Host gets 404 on the WebSocket upgrade — this looks like "relay is down" but isn't. - The stack is: relay + Postgres (events, search, memberships) + MinIO (media + git packfiles) + Redis (pub/sub only, nothing durable) + a git volume.
- On a closed relay (
RELAY_OWNER_PUBKEYset,BUZZ_REQUIRE_RELAY_MEMBERSHIP=true), everything that connects — humans AND agents — must be in the relay member roster.
Setup steps
cd deploy/compose && cp .env.example .env, then edit.env:- Secrets are all generated/invented locally. Nothing comes from a portal.
openssl rand -hex 32forBUZZ_RELAY_PRIVATE_KEYandBUZZ_GIT_HOOK_HMAC_SECRET; invent Postgres/Redis/S3 passwords (Compose creates those services with whatever you set). RELAY_OWNER_PUBKEY= the user's own pubkey, 64-char hex, from their Buzz Desktop profile. Footgun: this var has noBUZZ_prefix — easy to miss among neighbors that all do.BUZZ_RELAY_PRIVATE_KEYis the relay's identity. Set once, never rotate; back up.envitself.- Pin
BUZZ_IMAGEto a release tag for anything long-lived;:mainmoves daily.
- Secrets are all generated/invented locally. Nothing comes from a portal.
- Set the URL block (
BUZZ_DOMAIN,RELAY_URL,BUZZ_MEDIA_BASE_URL,BUZZ_MEDIA_SERVER_DOMAIN,BUZZ_CORS_ORIGINS) — all derive from one host choice. See the localhost footgun below before choosing. ./run.sh config(validates; catches leftover CHANGE_ME), then./run.sh start. TLS on a public domain:BUZZ_COMPOSE_TLS=true ./run.sh start.- Liveness:
curl -fsS http://127.0.0.1:3000/_liveness. - Register members:
./run.sh add-member <pubkey>for every human and every agent, withsleep 1between adds (same-second roster events collide). Verify with./run.sh list-members. - Connect the desktop app with the exact
RELAY_URL, create channels, add agents to channels, @mention.
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 106 lines · 42 tokens per session scan A 1064d0021957
buzz-self-hosting is a skill published in the GitHub repository tonbistudio/buzz-skills (278 stars, last pushed 3mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 42 tokens to every session and 2,318 once invoked, about $0.0002 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
buzz-self-hosting compared with skills from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| buzz-self-hostingtonbistudio/buzz-skills | Skill | 278 | 3mo ago | MIT | A | 42 | Claude Code, Codex |
| deploy-docker-composeomnigent-ai/omnigent | Skill | 11k | today | Apache-2.0 | A | 84 | Claude Code, Codex |
| bdd-container-updateNVIDIA-AI-Blueprints/video-search-and-summarization | Skill | 2.0k | today | Apache-2.0 | A | 117 | Cursor |
| securing-kubernetes-on-cloudxalgorix/xalgorix | Skill | 1.3k | yesterday | Apache-2.0 | A | 80 | Claude Code, Codex |
| detecting-privilege-escalation-in-kubernetes-podsxalgorix/xalgorix | Skill | 1.3k | yesterday | Apache-2.0 | A | 40 | Claude Code, Codex |
| docker-socket-mountPurpleAILAB/Decepticon | Skill | 6.5k | 8d ago | Apache-2.0 | B | 67 | Claude Code |
| k8s-networkingrohitg00/kubectl-mcp-server | Skill | 968 | 15d ago | MIT | A | 34 | Claude Code, Codex |