AuC is a Python framework for running a single AI agent with an asynchronous, pluggable reasoning loop, language-model adapters, permission levels, and observable events. It is used to build coding and conversational agents with tools, security checks, web interfaces, background jobs, evaluations, and isolated execution. The catalogue entries are skills for extending its agent workflow.
Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/ufy2024/AuCnpx agentmods add skills/ufy2024/auc/docker-patternsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/ufy2024/auc/docker-patterns)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/ufy2024/auc/docker-patterns"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/ufy2024/auc/docker-patterns/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/ufy2024/auc/docker-patterns"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/ufy2024/auc/docker-patterns.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 6 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 286 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 309 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 383 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 293 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Agent Snooping · line 20 Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.Fix: Remove all code or instructions that list or read other skills' files or directories. Skills should operate independently; cross-skill access is a privilege escalation.
- medium Tool Misuse · line 58 Tool defaults are unsafe or overly permissive (e.g. disabled TLS verification, no authentication, world-writable permissions). Unsafe defaults widen the attack surface.Fix: Override unsafe defaults with secure settings (verify=True, auth required, restrictive permissions). Review and harden all tool configurations.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00027 | $0.02146 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00014 | $0.01073 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00005 | $0.00429 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00003 | $0.00215 |
Grade A, and why
docker-patterns scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=3s CMD wget -qO- http://localhost:3000/health || exit 1 How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 385 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Docker Patterns
Docker and Docker Compose best practices for containerized development.
When to Activate
- Setting up Docker Compose for local development
- Designing multi-container architectures
- Troubleshooting container networking or volume issues
- Reviewing Dockerfiles for security and size
- Migrating from local dev to containerized workflow
Docker Compose for Local Development
Standard Web App Stack
# docker-compose.yml
services:
app:
build:
context: .
target: dev # Use dev stage of multi-stage Dockerfile
ports:
- "3000:3000"
volumes:
- .:/app # Bind mount for hot reload
- /app/node_modules # Anonymous volume -- preserves container deps
environment:
- DATABASE_URL=postgres://postgres:postgres@db:5432/app_dev
- REDIS_URL=redis://redis:6379/0
- NODE_ENV=development
depends_on:
db:
condition: service_healthy
redis:
condition: service_started
command: npm run dev
db:
image: postgres:16-alpine
ports:
- "5432:5432"
environment:
POSTGRES_USER: postgres
POSTGRES_PASSWORD: postgres
POSTGRES_DB: app_dev
volumes:
- pgdata:/var/lib/postgresql/data
- ./scripts/init-db.sql:/docker-entrypoint-initdb.d/init.sql
healthcheck:
test: ["CMD-SHELL", "pg_isready -U postgres"]
interval: 5s
timeout: 3s
retries: 5
redis:
image: redis:7-alpine
ports:
- "6379:6379"
volumes:
- redisdata:/data
mailpit: # Local email testing
image: axllent/mailpit
ports:
- "8025:8025" # Web UI
- "1025:1025" # SMTP
volumes:
pgdata:
redisdata:
Development vs Production Dockerfile
# Stage: dependencies
FROM node:22-alpine AS deps
WORKDIR /app
COPY package.json package-lock.json ./
RUN npm ci
# Stage: dev (hot reload, debug tools)
FROM node:22-alpine AS dev
WORKDIR /app
COPY --from=deps /app/node_modules ./node_modules
COPY . .
EXPOSE 3000
CMD ["npm", "run", "dev"]
# Stage: build
FROM node:22-alpine AS build
WORKDIR /app
COPY --from=deps /app/node_modules ./node_modules
COPY . .
RUN npm run build && npm prune --production
# Stage: production (minimal image)
FROM node:22-alpine AS production
WORKDIR /app
RUN addgroup -g 1001 -S appgroup && adduser -S appuser -u 1001
USER appuser
COPY --from=build --chown=appuser:appgroup /app/dist ./dist
COPY --from=build --chown=appuser:appgroup /app/node_modules ./node_modules
COPY --from=build --chown=appuser:appgroup /app/package.json ./
ENV NODE_ENV=production
EXPOSE 3000
HEALTHCHECK --interval=30s --timeout=3s CMD wget -qO- http://localhost:3000/health || exit 1
CMD ["node", "dist/server.js"]
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 385 lines · 27 tokens per session scan A 6145a177fecd
docker-patterns is a skill published in the GitHub repository ufy2024/AuC (1,090 stars, last pushed 1mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 27 tokens to every session and 2,146 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
deploy-docker-compose
Run the Omnigent server as a Docker compose stack (server + Postgres) on any Docker host — your laptop, a VPS, EC2 by hand, or as the base layer of any container-platform deploy. Invoke when the user wants to build the image, bring up the compose stack, debug the stack on a host they already have, or extend the stack…
compute-env-setup
Set up a reproducible Feynman compute environment for research jobs. Use when a task needs Python/R packages, GPU libraries, containers, Modal, SSH, caches, or managed model runtime setup.
securing-kubernetes-on-cloud
This skill covers hardening managed Kubernetes clusters on EKS, AKS, and GKE by implementing Pod Security Standards, network policies, workload identity, RBAC scoping, image admission controls, and runtime security monitoring. It addresses cloud-specific security features including IRSA for EKS, Workload Identity for…
detecting-privilege-escalation-in-kubernetes-pods
Detect and prevent privilege escalation in Kubernetes pods by monitoring security contexts, capabilities, and syscall patterns with Falco and OPA policies.
implementing-rbac-hardening-for-kubernetes
Harden Kubernetes Role-Based Access Control by implementing least-privilege policies, auditing role bindings, eliminating cluster-admin sprawl, and integrating external identity providers.
docker-socket-mount
Docker / containerd socket mounted into a container → host RCE. Common in CI runners, GitOps controllers (ArgoCD, Flux), and 'Docker-in-Docker' setups. Single-command escape via docker run --rm --privileged -v /:/host alpine chroot /host.