Recon Skills is a pack of security-testing skills covering reconnaissance, web applications, APIs, authentication, vulnerability validation, cloud infrastructure, and reporting. Security professionals use it for authorized assessments of systems they own or have written permission to test. The catalogue entries are individual skills from the pack.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill api-noauth-huntgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/api-noauth-hunt)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/api-noauth-hunt"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/api-noauth-hunt/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/api-noauth-hunt"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/api-noauth-hunt.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 4 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Supply Chain · line 85 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- high Tool Misuse · line 111 Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).Fix: Validate all tool parameters against an allowlist. Reject dangerous parameter values (shell=True, --force, -rf /) and use safe defaults.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 167 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 180 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00019 | $0.02222 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00010 | $0.01111 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00004 | $0.00444 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00222 |
Grade A, and why
api-noauth-hunt scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
compatibility: Requires curl, nmap, python3, masscan, subfinder, httpx, nuclei How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 232 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
API No-Authentication Validation
Identify API operations that may be reachable without the authentication or authorization required by their data and business function. Discovery is read-only by default. Write validation uses synthetic records and requires explicit authorization immediately before execution.
When to Use
- Port scan reveals HTTP services on non-standard ports (3000, 5000, 8080-8085, 9000).
- Target has an API subdomain (api.target.com, backend.target.com).
- JavaScript bundles reference internal API endpoints.
- After
port-service-discoveryfinds HTTP on unexpected ports. - After
firebase-supabase-attackidentifies backend APIs.
Prerequisites
- curl, python3, jq installed.
- Target URL or IP:port of the suspected API.
- List of common API paths for fuzzing.
How to Run
# Quick API test — try common paths without auth
TARGET="https://api.target.com"
for path in "/" "/api" "/api/v1" "/api/users" "/api/health" "/docs" "/swagger.json"; do
code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --max-time 5 --connect-timeout 5 "$TARGET$path")
echo "HTTP $code: $TARGET$path"
done
Quick Reference
| Signal | What It Means | Action |
|---|---|---|
HTTP 200 on /api/users or /api/clients |
Possible unauthenticated data access | Validate one bounded sample |
| HTTP 2xx on POST without auth | Possible unauthenticated write | Stop and obtain write authorization |
OpenAPI/Swagger at /docs, /swagger.json |
Full API map exposed | Enumerate all endpoints |
| Stack trace on error | Internal paths, framework version | Map infrastructure |
| State change via an unexpected method | Possible method-level authorization gap | Reproduce with a synthetic record |
| Login without password validation | Possible authentication bypass | Verify with an approved test account |
Procedure
Phase 1 — API Discovery
TARGET="$1" # URL or IP:port
OUTDIR="$OUTDIR/api_recon"
mkdir -p "$OUTDIR"
echo "[*] API discovery on $TARGET"
# Common API paths
API_PATHS=(
"/" "/api" "/api/v1" "/api/v2" "/v1" "/v2"
"/api/users" "/api/clients" "/api/admin" "/api/health"
"/api/auth" "/api/login" "/api/register"
"/api/products" "/api/orders" "/api/contracts"
"/docs" "/swagger.json" "/swagger.yaml" "/openapi.json"
"/api-docs" "/swagger-ui.html" "/graphql"
"/health" "/status" "/version" "/info" "/ping"
"/actuator" "/actuator/health" "/actuator/info" "/actuator/env"
)
for path in "${API_PATHS[@]}"; do
code=$(curl -sk -o /tmp/api_probe_$$.tmp -w "%{http_code}" --max-time 5 --connect-timeout 5 "$TARGET$path" 2>/dev/null)
if [[ "$code" == "200" ]]; then
body=$(cat /tmp/api_probe_$$.tmp)
content_type=$(file -b --mime-type /tmp/api_probe_$$.tmp 2>/dev/null)
# Check if it's JSON (likely API)
if echo "$body" | python3 -c "import sys,json; json.load(sys.stdin)" 2>/dev/null; then
record_count=$(echo "$body" | python3 -c "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(len(d) if isinstance(d,list) else 'object')" 2>/dev/null)
echo " [API] $path → HTTP 200 (JSON, ${record_count} records)"
elif echo "$body" | grep -qi "swagger\|openapi"; then
echo " [SWAGGER] $path → HTTP 200 (API documentation)"
elif echo "$body" | grep -qi "graphql"; then
echo " [GRAPHQL] $path → HTTP 200"
else
echo " [HTTP] $path → HTTP 200 (${#body} bytes, $content_type)"
fi
elif [[ "$code" == "401" || "$code" == "403" ]]; then
echo " [AUTH] $path → HTTP $code (protected)"
elif [[ "$code" == "500" ]]; then
echo " [ERROR] $path → HTTP 500 (potential injection point)"
cat /tmp/api_probe_$$.tmp | head -5
elif [[ "$code" != "404" && "$code" != "000" ]]; then
echo " [$code] $path"
fi
done
rm -f /tmp/api_probe_$$.tmp
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 232 lines · 19 tokens per session scan A fd3ef58bd3ba
api-noauth-hunt is a skill published in the GitHub repository uphiago/recon-skills (1,247 stars, last pushed 7d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 19 tokens to every session and 2,222 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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auditing-azure-active-directory-configuration
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auditing-gcp-iam-permissions
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