Recon Skills is a pack of security-testing skills covering reconnaissance, web applications, APIs, authentication, vulnerability validation, cloud infrastructure, and reporting. Security professionals use it for authorized assessments of systems they own or have written permission to test. The catalogue entries are individual skills from the pack.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill exchange-owa-attackgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/exchange-owa-attack)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/exchange-owa-attack"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/exchange-owa-attack/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/exchange-owa-attack"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/exchange-owa-attack.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 2 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 200 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 240 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00022 | $0.03057 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00011 | $0.01528 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00004 | $0.00611 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00306 |
Grade A, and why
exchange-owa-attack scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
compatibility: Requires curl, nmap, python3, masscan, subfinder, httpx, nuclei How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 267 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Exchange/OWA Attack Skill
Exchange Outlook Web Access reconnaissance covering endpoint mapping, NTLM Type-2 metadata, authentication controls, and version evidence. Password or lockout testing requires explicit authorization and approved identities.
When to Use
- Target has
owa.,mail.,webmail.,exchange., orautodiscover.subdomains. - crt.sh reveals Exchange-related SAN names (
mail.domain.com,autodiscover.domain.com). - Port 443 returns NTLM
WWW-Authenticate: NegotiateorWWW-Authenticate: NTLM. - After
subdomain-enumerationdiscovers mail-related hosts. - After
port-service-discoveryfinds HTTPS on port 443 with Exchange fingerprints.
Prerequisites
terminalwith curl, python3.- Target Exchange/OWA URL.
- For password spray: list of usernames (from recon) and password candidates.
How to Run
# Quick Exchange detection
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -skI "https://TARGET/owa/" | grep -iE "x-owa-version|x-feserver|exchange|microsoft"
# NTLM challenge capture (AD domain leak)
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -skI "https://TARGET/owa/" -H "Authorization: Negotiate TlRMTVNTUAABAAAAB4IIogAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAGAbEdAAAADw==" | grep -i "www-authenticate"
Quick Reference
| Technique | What It Reveals | Severity |
|---|---|---|
| NTLM Type-2 decode | AD domain, NetBIOS name, computer name, AD timestamp | High |
| OWA version header | Exchange version, CU level, patch status | Medium |
/owa/auth/logon.aspx |
Login page, brute force surface | Medium |
/ecp/ |
Exchange Control Panel (admin) | High |
/ews/ |
Exchange Web Services (SOAP API) | Medium |
/autodiscover/ |
Autodiscover configuration | Medium |
/mapi/ |
MAPI over HTTP | Low |
/Microsoft-Server-ActiveSync |
Mobile device sync | Medium |
/rpc/ |
Outlook Anywhere (RPC over HTTP) | Low |
Procedure
Phase 1 — Exchange Detection & Fingerprinting
TARGET="$1"
OUTDIR="$OUTDIR/exchange"
mkdir -p "$OUTDIR"
echo "[*] Exchange detection on $TARGET"
# OWA probe
OWA_RESP=$(curl -skI --max-time 10 --connect-timeout 10 "https://$TARGET/owa/" 2>/dev/null)
echo "$OWA_RESP" > "$OUTDIR/owa_headers.txt"
# Version extraction
X_OWA=$(echo "$OWA_RESP" | grep -i "x-owa-version" | sed 's/.*: //')
X_FE=$(echo "$OWA_RESP" | grep -i "x-feserver" | sed 's/.*: //')
if [[ -n "$X_OWA" ]]; then
echo "[+] Exchange confirmed — OWA Version: $X_OWA"
echo " Frontend server: ${X_FE:-unknown}"
# Map version to CU
# 15.1.x = Exchange 2016, 15.2.x = Exchange 2019
MAJOR=$(echo "$X_OWA" | cut -d. -f1-2)
if [[ "$MAJOR" == "15.1" ]]; then
echo " Product: Exchange 2016"
elif [[ "$MAJOR" == "15.2" ]]; then
echo " Product: Exchange 2019"
fi
else
echo "[-] No OWA version header — may not be Exchange"
fi
# Key endpoints probe
declare -A EX_ENDPOINTS
EX_ENDPOINTS["/owa/auth/logon.aspx"]="Login page"
EX_ENDPOINTS["/ecp/"]="Exchange Control Panel (admin)"
EX_ENDPOINTS["/ews/exchange.asmx"]="Exchange Web Services (SOAP)"
EX_ENDPOINTS["/autodiscover/autodiscover.xml"]="Autodiscover"
EX_ENDPOINTS["/mapi/emsmdb/"]="MAPI over HTTP"
EX_ENDPOINTS["/Microsoft-Server-ActiveSync/"]="ActiveSync"
EX_ENDPOINTS["/rpc/rpcproxy.dll"]="Outlook Anywhere"
EX_ENDPOINTS["/owa/healthcheck.htm"]="Health check"
echo ""
echo "[*] Endpoint probe:"
for ep in "${!EX_ENDPOINTS[@]}"; do
code=$(curl -sk -o /dev/null -w "%{http_code}" --max-time 5 --connect-timeout 5 "https://$TARGET$ep")
[[ "$code" == "200" ]] && echo " [OPEN] $ep — ${EX_ENDPOINTS[$ep]}"
[[ "$code" == "302" ]] && echo " [REDIR] $ep — ${EX_ENDPOINTS[$ep]}"
[[ "$code" == "401" ]] && echo " [AUTH] $ep — ${EX_ENDPOINTS[$ep]}"
done
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 267 lines · 22 tokens per session scan A e5659e6f12e6
exchange-owa-attack is a skill published in the GitHub repository uphiago/recon-skills (1,251 stars, last pushed 9d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 22 tokens to every session and 3,057 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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