Recon Skills is a pack of security-testing skills covering reconnaissance, web applications, APIs, authentication, vulnerability validation, cloud infrastructure, and reporting. Security professionals use it for authorized assessments of systems they own or have written permission to test. The catalogue entries are individual skills from the pack.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill hunt-brute-forcegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-brute-force)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-brute-force"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-brute-force/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-brute-force"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-brute-force.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 8 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high YARA Match · line 227 YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 55 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 137 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 143 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 144 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 145 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 157 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 198 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00127 | $0.05372 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00063 | $0.02686 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00025 | $0.01074 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00537 |
Grade B, and why
hunt-brute-force scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Sends data to an external URLmediumData exfiltration
A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -X POST "https://$TARGET/forgot-password" -d "email=$VALID_USER" | grep -i "sent\|exist\|not found\|registered" Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
CODE_RESP=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -o /tmp/bf_body -w "%{http_code} %{time_total}" \ How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 317 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
HUNT-BRUTE-FORCE — Rate Limiting / Brute Force / Enumeration
Grounding note: this skill is built from published technique classes, not from a curated set of named HackerOne reports.
report_countis intentionally0— do not cite an exact payout or report ID you cannot verify. Where a public case is well-documented (e.g. Laxman Muthiyah's Instagram password-reset OTP race/rotation research, 2019–2021), it is named below as a technique reference, not a payout claim.
Crown Jewel Targets
OTP brute force (6-digit = 1,000,000 combinations) with no effective rate limit = Critical ATO bypass.
Highest-value chains:
- OTP / 2FA brute → MFA bypass → ATO — no effective rate limit on
/verify-otp, full 000000–999999 keyspace reachable - Password-reset token brute — short/predictable/non-expiring tokens + no rate limit → ATO (the Instagram 2019 case combined a 6-digit reset code, no rate limit per request-source, and IP rotation to make 10^6 tractable)
- Username/email enumeration → targeted credential stuffing — valid/invalid distinguishable by response string, status code, or timing, then sprayed with breach corpora
- Coupon / gift-card / referral code brute — no rate limit on code validation → financial impact
- ReDoS — attacker-controlled input hits a catastrophic-backtracking regex → CPU exhaustion → DoS
CRITICAL: Four rate-limit states — do not collapse them
A 200/401 with no 429 does not mean "no rate limiting". A rate-limiting
skill that only checks for 429/lockout produces false negatives. Classify the
defense BEFORE concluding, by sending a burst of ~50 requests and watching the
full response (status, body, headers, latency, and downstream success):
| State | Signal | Brute still feasible? |
|---|---|---|
| Hard account lockout | account disabled after N fails; later correct creds also fail | No (but lockout itself can be a DoS finding) |
| Soft IP throttle | 429 / increasing latency keyed on source IP only |
Yes — bypass via header/IP rotation (Phase 4) |
| CAPTCHA injection | 200 but body switches to a CAPTCHA challenge after N |
Maybe — check if the verify endpoint enforces it server-side or if the API path skips it |
| Silent shadow-throttle | 200/401 returned for every request, but submissions are dropped — the genuinely-correct OTP/password stops being accepted, or responses become canned |
This is the trap. A naive loop sees "all 200, no 429" and reports "no rate limit" — false. |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 317 lines · 127 tokens per session scan B b2c334b4ff7a
hunt-brute-force is a skill published in the GitHub repository uphiago/recon-skills (1,254 stars, last pushed 10d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 127 tokens to every session and 5,372 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (sends data to an external url, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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