Recon Skills is a pack of security-testing skills covering reconnaissance, web applications, APIs, authentication, vulnerability validation, cloud infrastructure, and reporting. Security professionals use it for authorized assessments of systems they own or have written permission to test. The catalogue entries are individual skills from the pack.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill hunt-cloud-misconfiggit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-cloud-misconfig.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 4 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 40 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 18 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium MCP Rug Pull · line 51 Docker image references without a specific tag (:latest is implicit) or digest (@sha256:...) can be silently replaced by a malicious image.Fix: Pin the image: image:tag or image@sha256:abc123
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 60 Data is uploaded to cloud storage (S3 / GCS / Azure Blob). This may be a legitimate backup or exfiltration to an external bucket. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination bucket is trusted and owned by you. Never upload credentials, secrets, or workspace contents to external or unverified cloud storage.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00197 | $0.03784 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00098 | $0.01892 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00039 | $0.00757 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00020 | $0.00378 |
Grade B, and why
hunt-cloud-misconfig scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Sends data to an external URLmediumData exfiltration
A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -X PUT "https://TARGET-APP.firebaseio.com/test.json" -d '"pwned"' # write Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://TARGET-NAME.s3.amazonaws.com/?max-keys=10" How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 226 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
HUNT-CLOUD-MISCONFIG — Cloud / Infrastructure Misconfigurations
Crown Jewel Targets
S3 / GCS / Azure Blob
# S3 listing
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://TARGET-NAME.s3.amazonaws.com/?max-keys=10"
aws s3 ls s3://target-bucket-name --no-sign-request
# Try common bucket names
for name in target target-backup target-assets target-prod target-staging; do
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -o /dev/null -w "$name: %{http_code}\n" "https://$name.s3.amazonaws.com/"
done
# Firebase open rules
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://TARGET-APP.firebaseio.com/.json" # read
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -X PUT "https://TARGET-APP.firebaseio.com/test.json" -d '"pwned"' # write
EC2 Metadata (via SSRF)
http://[REDACTED_IP]/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ # role name
http://[REDACTED_IP]/latest/meta-data/iam/security-credentials/ROLE-NAME # keys
Exposed Admin Panels
/jenkins /grafana /kibana /elasticsearch /swagger-ui.html
/phpMyAdmin /.env /config.json /api-docs /server-status
Local-verificationtoolchain
For testing cloud-misconfig findings against a local AWS sim before/instead of hitting real cloud:
# LocalStack 3.0 community (pin the version — 4.x requires a Pro license)
docker run -d --name lab-localstack -p 14566:4566 localstack/localstack:3.0
# awscli ≥ 2.30 + LocalStack 3.0 incompatibility workaround (x-amz-trailer header):
export AWS_REQUEST_CHECKSUM_CALCULATION=when_required
export AWS_RESPONSE_CHECKSUM_VALIDATION=when_required
export AWS_ENDPOINT_URL=http://localhost:14566
export AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID=test AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY=test AWS_DEFAULT_REGION=us-east-1
Without those env vars, aws s3 cp/sync fails with InvalidRequest. Document this for the team. See docs/verification/phase2j-cloud-localstack.md for the full reproducible flow.
CloudWatch RUM Weaponization (2024-2026 surface)
AWS CloudWatch RUM (Real-User Monitoring) is a client-side telemetry service launched late 2021. Customers embed a JS snippet on their pages that sends performance/error events to dataplane.rum.<region>.amazonaws.com. The snippet's AppMonitor config contains an identityPoolId (Cognito) and guestRoleArn (IAM role) — both public by design. The IAM role policy is the security boundary, and when developers leave it broader than the documented minimum (rum:PutRumEvents on the AppMonitor ARN), the entire pool becomes the unauthenticated AWS-credential vending machine described in cloud-iam-deep → Cognito Identity Pool chain.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 226 lines · 197 tokens per session scan B 20842378f54b
hunt-cloud-misconfig is a skill published in the GitHub repository uphiago/recon-skills (1,251 stars, last pushed 9d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 197 tokens to every session and 3,784 once invoked, about $0.0010 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (sends data to an external url, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
auditing-gcp-iam-permissions
Auditing Google Cloud Platform IAM permissions to identify overly permissive bindings, primitive role usage, service account key proliferation, and cross-project access risks using gcloud CLI, Policy Analyzer, and IAM Recommender.
auditing-terraform-infrastructure-for-security
Auditing Terraform infrastructure-as-code for security misconfigurations using Checkov, tfsec, Terrascan, and OPA/Rego policies to detect overly permissive IAM policies, public resource exposure, missing encryption, and insecure defaults before cloud deployment.
detecting-compromised-cloud-credentials
Detecting compromised cloud credentials across AWS, Azure, and GCP by analyzing anomalous API activity, impossible travel patterns, unauthorized resource provisioning, and credential abuse indicators using GuardDuty, Defender for Identity, and SCC Event Threat Detection.
detecting-misconfigured-azure-storage
Detecting misconfigured Azure Storage accounts including publicly accessible blob containers, missing encryption settings, overly permissive SAS tokens, disabled logging, and network access violations using Azure CLI, PowerShell, and Microsoft Defender for Storage.
detecting-s3-data-exfiltration-attempts
Detecting data exfiltration attempts from AWS S3 buckets by analyzing CloudTrail S3 data events, VPC Flow Logs, GuardDuty findings, Amazon Macie alerts, and S3 access patterns to identify unauthorized bulk downloads and cross-account data transfers.
implementing-aws-config-rules-for-compliance
Implementing AWS Config rules for continuous compliance monitoring of AWS resources, deploying managed and custom rules aligned to CIS and PCI DSS frameworks, configuring automatic remediation with SSM Automation, and aggregating compliance data across accounts.