Recon Skills is a pack of security-testing skills covering reconnaissance, web applications, APIs, authentication, vulnerability validation, cloud infrastructure, and reporting. Security professionals use it for authorized assessments of systems they own or have written permission to test. The catalogue entries are individual skills from the pack.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill hunt-corsgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-cors)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-cors"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-cors/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-cors"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-cors.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 6 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 75 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 98 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 114 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 143 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 165 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 362 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00099 | $0.05495 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00049 | $0.02747 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00020 | $0.01099 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00010 | $0.00549 |
Grade A, and why
hunt-cors scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 9d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
result=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -D - -o /dev/null "$url" \ How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 397 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
HUNT-CORS — Cross-Origin Resource Sharing Misconfiguration
What actually pays (and what does not)
CORS pays High only when an attacker-controlled origin can perform a
credentialed cross-origin read of sensitive authenticated data, and you
have a browser PoC proving the response body is readable from evil.com.
Two hard browser rules that kill most "findings" — check these FIRST:
Access-Control-Allow-Origin: *CANNOT be combined with credentials. If the server returnsACAO: *, the browser refuses to send/expose the response for acredentials: includerequest. A wildcard-only endpoint is not credential-exploitable. It is only interesting if the data it serves is sensitive without a session (rare) — usually this is Informational/Low.Access-Control-Allow-Credentials: trueis meaningless on its own. It matters only ifACAOreflects/allows your specific attacker origin AND a cross-origin credentialedfetchactually returns a readable body. ACAC on a response that does not reflect your origin proves nothing.
If you cannot demonstrate a readable cross-origin authed body in a real browser, you do not have a High. Do not submit header-diffing alone.
Crown Jewel Targets
- Reflect-any-origin + credentials — server echoes the
Originheader AND setsACAC: true→ any site reads authed API responses. The classic High. - Null-origin trust —
ACAO: null+ACAC: true. Asandboxiframe (or adata:/redirect chain) emitsOrigin: null, so any page can read authed data. - Subdomain-regex bypass — trusted-origin regex with a parsing flaw. The correct payload depends on which flaw (see Phase 3 — this is where most skills get it wrong).
- Subdomain takeover → trusted origin — a dangling subdomain that the CORS policy trusts; take it over, host the PoC there (see hunt-subdomain).
- postMessage missing/loose origin check — handler that processes
event.datawithout strictly validatingevent.origin.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 9d ago First seen · 397 lines · 99 tokens per session scan A 75fa3421a31b
hunt-cors is a skill published in the GitHub repository uphiago/recon-skills (1,254 stars, last pushed 11d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 99 tokens to every session and 5,495 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
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Complete reference for 26 web2 bug classes with root causes, detection patterns, bypass tables, exploit techniques, and real paid examples. Covers IDOR, auth bypass, XSS, SSRF (11 IP bypass techniques), SQLi, business logic, race conditions, OAuth/OIDC, file upload (10 bypass techniques), GraphQL, LLM/AI (ASI01-ASI10…
auditing-gcp-iam-permissions
Auditing Google Cloud Platform IAM permissions to identify overly permissive bindings, primitive role usage, service account key proliferation, and cross-project access risks using gcloud CLI, Policy Analyzer, and IAM Recommender.
detecting-compromised-cloud-credentials
Detecting compromised cloud credentials across AWS, Azure, and GCP by analyzing anomalous API activity, impossible travel patterns, unauthorized resource provisioning, and credential abuse indicators using GuardDuty, Defender for Identity, and SCC Event Threat Detection.
detecting-s3-data-exfiltration-attempts
Detecting data exfiltration attempts from AWS S3 buckets by analyzing CloudTrail S3 data events, VPC Flow Logs, GuardDuty findings, Amazon Macie alerts, and S3 access patterns to identify unauthorized bulk downloads and cross-account data transfers.
implementing-aws-config-rules-for-compliance
Implementing AWS Config rules for continuous compliance monitoring of AWS resources, deploying managed and custom rules aligned to CIS and PCI DSS frameworks, configuring automatic remediation with SSM Automation, and aggregating compliance data across accounts.
implementing-aws-security-hub-compliance
Implementing AWS Security Hub to aggregate security findings across AWS accounts, enable compliance standards like CIS AWS Foundations and PCI DSS, configure automated remediation with EventBridge and Lambda, and create custom security insights for organizational risk management.