Recon Skills is a pack of security-testing skills covering reconnaissance, web applications, APIs, authentication, vulnerability validation, cloud infrastructure, and reporting. Security professionals use it for authorized assessments of systems they own or have written permission to test. The catalogue entries are individual skills from the pack.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill hunt-race-conditiongit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-race-condition)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-race-condition"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-race-condition/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-race-condition"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-race-condition.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 4 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 351 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 684 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 181 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 118 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00140 | $0.10693 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00056 | $0.04277 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00028 | $0.02139 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00014 | $0.01069 |
Grade A, and why
hunt-race-condition scanned grade A with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootlowPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
1. Capture the loopback or your egress interface during the attack: `sudo tcpdump -i lo0 -w race.pcap port 443` (or interface 0). Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
- `curl` with `&` backgrounding How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 756 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Crown Jewel Targets
Race conditions are high-severity findings because they break financial, access control, and integrity assumptions that defenders rarely stress-test. Highest payouts come from:
- Monetary/credit systems — double-spending gift cards, coupons, referral bonuses, promotional credits, wallet balances
- Vote/reputation manipulation — upvoting the same content multiple times, gaming leaderboards or trending algorithms
- Account limits bypass — exceeding free-tier quotas, bypassing "one per user" restrictions on invites, trial activations, or API key generation
- Privilege escalation — racing role assignment or permission checks during user creation/upgrade flows
- Deletion bypass — reading or exfiltrating data during a narrow window between "marked for deletion" and "actually deleted"
- Payment flows — charging a card once but receiving multiple fulfillments
Best-paying asset types: Fintech apps, SaaS platforms with credit/subscription models, social platforms with reputation systems, e-commerce checkout flows, OAuth/SSO token endpoints.
Attack Surface Signals
URL Patterns
/vote, /upvote, /like, /favorite
/redeem, /apply-coupon, /use-code, /claim
/purchase, /checkout, /confirm-order, /pay
/transfer, /withdraw, /send-money
/invite, /referral, /accept-invite
/upgrade, /activate, /trial
/delete, /deactivate, /cancel
/follow, /subscribe
Response Headers That Signal Race-Prone Backends
X-RateLimit-* # rate limiting exists, but may not be atomic
X-Request-Id # each request independently tracked
No Cache-Control # stateful ops not idempotent
JavaScript Patterns to Grep
// Single-use action buttons with client-side disable
button.disabled = true
$('#btn').prop('disabled', true)
// Optimistic UI updates (state set before server confirms)
setState({ used: true })
// Sequential async calls without locking
await useVoucher(); await deductBalance();
Tech Stack Signals
- Ruby on Rails without
with_lock/lock!— ActiveRecord doesn't lock by default - Node.js with async/await chains — non-atomic DB reads then writes
- PHP without
SELECT ... FOR UPDATE— common in legacy codebases - Microservices — inter-service calls introduce natural TOCTOU windows
- Redis counters without Lua scripts or
INCRatomicity checks - Message queues — idempotency keys often missing
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 756 lines · 140 tokens per session scan A e658469d7331
hunt-race-condition is a skill published in the GitHub repository uphiago/recon-skills (1,323 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 140 tokens to every session and 10,693 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 2 findings (asks for root, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
implementing-cloud-dlp-for-data-protection
Implementing Cloud Data Loss Prevention (DLP) using Amazon Macie, Azure Information Protection, and Google Cloud DLP API to discover, classify, and protect sensitive data across cloud storage, databases, and data pipelines.
auditing-aws-s3-bucket-permissions
Systematically audit AWS S3 bucket permissions to identify publicly accessible buckets, overly permissive ACLs, misconfigured bucket policies, and missing encryption settings using AWS CLI, S3audit, and Prowler to enforce least-privilege data access controls.
auditing-gcp-iam-permissions
Auditing Google Cloud Platform IAM permissions to identify overly permissive bindings, primitive role usage, service account key proliferation, and cross-project access risks using gcloud CLI, Policy Analyzer, and IAM Recommender.
auditing-terraform-infrastructure-for-security
Auditing Terraform infrastructure-as-code for security misconfigurations using Checkov, tfsec, Terrascan, and OPA/Rego policies to detect overly permissive IAM policies, public resource exposure, missing encryption, and insecure defaults before cloud deployment.
detecting-compromised-cloud-credentials
Detecting compromised cloud credentials across AWS, Azure, and GCP by analyzing anomalous API activity, impossible travel patterns, unauthorized resource provisioning, and credential abuse indicators using GuardDuty, Defender for Identity, and SCC Event Threat Detection.
detecting-misconfigured-azure-storage
Detecting misconfigured Azure Storage accounts including publicly accessible blob containers, missing encryption settings, overly permissive SAS tokens, disabled logging, and network access violations using Azure CLI, PowerShell, and Microsoft Defender for Storage.