Recon Skills is a pack of security-testing skills covering reconnaissance, web applications, APIs, authentication, vulnerability validation, cloud infrastructure, and reporting. Security professionals use it for authorized assessments of systems they own or have written permission to test. The catalogue entries are individual skills from the pack.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill hunt-sharepointgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-sharepoint)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-sharepoint"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-sharepoint/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-sharepoint"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-sharepoint.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 160 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 189 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 300 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00170 | $0.08591 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00085 | $0.04296 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00034 | $0.01718 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00017 | $0.00859 |
Grade A, and why
hunt-sharepoint scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 7d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://target.example/_vti_inf.html" Copies of this mod
1 near-identical copy found in the catalogue:
- hunt-sharepoint — 89% identical, 79 lines differ
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 475 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Crown Jewel Targets
SharePoint Server (on-prem) is one of the richest enterprise attack surfaces in 2025-2026 bug bounty / red-team work. Three forces converge:
- End-of-life unpatched code paths. SharePoint Server 2013 reached extended-support EoL on 2023-04-11 (final build
15.0.5545.1000/ KB5002381). Every SharePoint CVE published after that date is permanently unpatched on SP2013 farms. SP2016 reaches EoL 2026-07-14; SP2019 reaches EoL 2026-07-14 (next 2 months as of May 2026); only SP Subscription Edition is currently in active support. - CVE-2025-53770 / 53771 "ToolShell" — July 2025 emergency-out-of-band patch chain for SPE / SP2019 / SP2016. The vulnerable code path (anonymous
/_layouts/15/ToolPane.aspx?DisplayMode=Edit+ anonymous__REQUESTDIGEST+ unencrypted ViewState) is present in SP2013 too and will never receive a fix. - Custom branded login pages forget legacy SOAP login.
/_vti_bin/Authentication.asmxwith theLoginSOAP op is the SharePoint equivalent of WordPress XMLRPC bypass — accepts native Forms credentials anonymously with no rate limit on most farms even when the branded UI has lockout.
Highest-value SharePoint targets:
- SP2013 farms still on the public internet — every CVE since April 2023 is unpatched. Critical-severity findings.
- Dealer / partner / supplier portals built on SharePoint by enterprise integrators (German VW group, a enterprise system integrator, etc.) — high-impact business data, often nested inside corporate AD trees.
- SharePoint farms with anonymous Forms-auth zones — Authentication.asmx becomes anonymously brute-forceable.
- SharePoint inside corporate AD parent forests — NTLM Type-2 leak (see
hunt-ntlm-info) discloses the parent forest membership. - Telerik-integrated SharePoint installations — additional deserialization sinks on top of SP's own.
Asset types that pay most: internet-reachable SP Server (any version) > SP Online with custom solutions hooks > intranet SP only after VPN compromise.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 7d ago First seen · 475 lines · 170 tokens per session scan A 5aff5ae023a6
hunt-sharepoint is a skill published in the GitHub repository uphiago/recon-skills (1,254 stars, last pushed 9d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 170 tokens to every session and 8,591 once invoked, about $0.0009 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
auditing-gcp-iam-permissions
Auditing Google Cloud Platform IAM permissions to identify overly permissive bindings, primitive role usage, service account key proliferation, and cross-project access risks using gcloud CLI, Policy Analyzer, and IAM Recommender.
detecting-compromised-cloud-credentials
Detecting compromised cloud credentials across AWS, Azure, and GCP by analyzing anomalous API activity, impossible travel patterns, unauthorized resource provisioning, and credential abuse indicators using GuardDuty, Defender for Identity, and SCC Event Threat Detection.
implementing-aws-config-rules-for-compliance
Implementing AWS Config rules for continuous compliance monitoring of AWS resources, deploying managed and custom rules aligned to CIS and PCI DSS frameworks, configuring automatic remediation with SSM Automation, and aggregating compliance data across accounts.
implementing-cloud-dlp-for-data-protection
Implementing Cloud Data Loss Prevention (DLP) using Amazon Macie, Azure Information Protection, and Google Cloud DLP API to discover, classify, and protect sensitive data across cloud storage, databases, and data pipelines.
implementing-cloud-trail-log-analysis
Implementing AWS CloudTrail log analysis for security monitoring, threat detection, and forensic investigation using Athena, CloudWatch Logs Insights, and SIEM integration to identify unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and suspicious API activity.
implementing-zero-trust-network-access
Implementing Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) in cloud environments by configuring identity-aware proxies, micro-segmentation, continuous verification with conditional access policies, and replacing traditional VPN-based access with BeyondCorp-style architectures across AWS, Azure, and GCP.