Recon Skills is a pack of security-testing skills covering reconnaissance, web applications, APIs, authentication, vulnerability validation, cloud infrastructure, and reporting. Security professionals use it for authorized assessments of systems they own or have written permission to test. The catalogue entries are individual skills from the pack.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill hunt-source-leakgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-source-leak)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-source-leak"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-source-leak/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-source-leak"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-source-leak.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 9 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 71 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 72 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 73 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Supply Chain · line 81 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- high Supply Chain · line 114 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 375 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 404 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 407 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 425 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00094 | $0.04422 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00047 | $0.02211 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00019 | $0.00884 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00442 |
Grade B, and why
hunt-source-leak scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Downloads and executes remote codemediumSupply chain
curl | sh runs whatever the server returns today, which is not necessarily what it returned when this was reviewed.
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://$TARGET/asset-manifest.json" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
STATUS=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s -o /tmp/sl_test -w "%{http_code}" "https://$TARGET$PATH") How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 431 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
HUNT-SOURCE-LEAK — Source Code & Build Artifact Leakage
Crown Jewel Targets
Source map exposing TypeScript source = see all API routes, auth logic, secrets. Swagger/OpenAPI JSON = complete API surface map.
Highest-value findings:
.js.mapsource maps — reconstruct full TypeScript/ES6 source code → find hardcoded API keys, internal endpoints, auth logic bypassesswagger.json/openapi.json— complete REST API specification with all endpoints, parameters, auth schemes, and internal route names.env/.env.production— APP_KEY, DB_PASSWORD, API_KEY, SECRET_KEY in plaintext.git/exposure —git clonethe entire source history → all past hardcoded secretsasset-manifest.json/_next/static/— all JS bundle paths → systematic source map discoverybuild-info/info.json— git commit hash, build timestamp, dependency versions → CVE targeting
Pitfalls (Read Before Probes)
1. Fake Source Maps — HTML Serving as .map
Some SPAs (Angular/React on nginx) serve their index.html for any unhandled route, including .js.map URLs. The URL ends in .map and returns HTTP 200, but the content is HTML — not JSON.
Detect before processing:
# First 80 bytes tell the story
head -c 80 /tmp/map_file
# "<!DOCTYPE" or "<html" = faux map (SPA serving HTML)
# "{" or ")))}" = real source map
python3 -c "
with open('/tmp/map_file') as f:
d = f.read()
if d.strip().startswith('{'): print('Real source map')
elif '<!DOCTYPE' in d or '<html' in d: print('FAUX — SPA serving HTML')
else: print(f'Unknown, first 80b: {repr(d[:80])}')
"
Fallback: Download raw JS bundles and grep directly (Phase 8).
2. BusyBox / Alpine grep -P
On minimal containers (Alpine Linux), grep -P (Perl-compatible regex) is NOT available. This affects Phase 2 Step 2, Phase 7, and swagger extraction. Use Python3 re instead:
# Instead of: grep -Eo 'pattern' file
python3 -c "import sys, re; print(*(re.findall(r'pattern', sys.stdin.read())), sep='\n')" < file
What ships with it
1 file beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 431 lines · 94 tokens per session scan B 3ef3c155bd35
hunt-source-leak is a skill published in the GitHub repository uphiago/recon-skills (1,254 stars, last pushed 10d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 94 tokens to every session and 4,422 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (downloads and executes remote code, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
Other skills, from other repositories
auditing-gcp-iam-permissions
Auditing Google Cloud Platform IAM permissions to identify overly permissive bindings, primitive role usage, service account key proliferation, and cross-project access risks using gcloud CLI, Policy Analyzer, and IAM Recommender.
detecting-compromised-cloud-credentials
Detecting compromised cloud credentials across AWS, Azure, and GCP by analyzing anomalous API activity, impossible travel patterns, unauthorized resource provisioning, and credential abuse indicators using GuardDuty, Defender for Identity, and SCC Event Threat Detection.
implementing-aws-config-rules-for-compliance
Implementing AWS Config rules for continuous compliance monitoring of AWS resources, deploying managed and custom rules aligned to CIS and PCI DSS frameworks, configuring automatic remediation with SSM Automation, and aggregating compliance data across accounts.
implementing-cloud-dlp-for-data-protection
Implementing Cloud Data Loss Prevention (DLP) using Amazon Macie, Azure Information Protection, and Google Cloud DLP API to discover, classify, and protect sensitive data across cloud storage, databases, and data pipelines.
implementing-cloud-trail-log-analysis
Implementing AWS CloudTrail log analysis for security monitoring, threat detection, and forensic investigation using Athena, CloudWatch Logs Insights, and SIEM integration to identify unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and suspicious API activity.
implementing-zero-trust-network-access
Implementing Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) in cloud environments by configuring identity-aware proxies, micro-segmentation, continuous verification with conditional access policies, and replacing traditional VPN-based access with BeyondCorp-style architectures across AWS, Azure, and GCP.