Recon Skills is a pack of security-testing skills covering reconnaissance, web applications, APIs, authentication, vulnerability validation, cloud infrastructure, and reporting. Security professionals use it for authorized assessments of systems they own or have written permission to test. The catalogue entries are individual skills from the pack.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill hunt-supabasegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-supabase)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-supabase"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-supabase/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-supabase"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-supabase.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 13 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 50 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 52 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 53 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Supply Chain · line 57 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- high Supply Chain · line 93 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- high Supply Chain · line 145 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- high Supply Chain · line 216 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- high Supply Chain · line 235 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- high Supply Chain · line 416 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 145 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Excessive Agency · line 192 Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.Fix: Add human-in-the-loop confirmation for destructive, irreversible, or high-impact operations. Never auto-execute commands that modify files, send data, or alter system state.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 235 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 256 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00133 | $0.05615 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00053 | $0.02246 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00027 | $0.01123 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00013 | $0.00562 |
Grade B, and why
hunt-supabase scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured today.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Downloads and executes remote codemediumSupply chain
curl | sh runs whatever the server returns today, which is not necessarily what it returned when this was reviewed.
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://$TARGET/manifest.json" | python3 -c "import sys, json; d = json.load(sys.stdin); print(d)" 2>/dev/null Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
- Tooling: `curl`, `python3`. How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 470 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
HUNT-SUPABASE — Supabase Exploitation
When to Use
- A JS bundle, .env.
- APK reveals a Supabase URL (project.supabase.co) and anon key (eyJ...).
Prerequisites
- Explicit authorization, target boundaries, and rate limits for the target.
- Tooling:
curl,python3. - A writable evidence directory:
export OUTPUT_DIR="${OUTPUT_DIR:-./output}" && mkdir -p "$OUTPUT_DIR". - For any state-changing step (writes, uploads, credential attempts), obtain explicit confirmation immediately before the command.
How to Run
# Set once per engagement; every step below uses these.
TARGET="example.com" # or the engagement target
export OUTPUT_DIR="${OUTPUT_DIR:-./output}"
# Download JS bundles and search for Supabase
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://$TARGET" | grep -Eo 'src="[^"]*\.js"' | cut -d'"' -f2 | while read js; do
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://$TARGET$js" -o "/tmp/$(basename $js)"
done
# Search for Supabase URL pattern
grep -rEn 'https://[a-z0-9-]+\.supabase\.co' /tmp/*.js
grep -rEn 'supabaseUrl|SUPABASE_URL|supabaseKey|SUPABASE_ANON_KEY' /tmp/*.js
# Search for Supabase JWT anon key
grep -rEn 'eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9\.[^[:space:]]+' /tmp/*.js
# Quick one-liner
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://$TARGET" | grep -Eo 'https://[a-z0-9-]+\.supabase\.co'
Procedure
The phases below are the procedure. Keep each probe bounded (--max-time), record evidence beneath OUTPUT_DIR, and stop at the stop-conditions listed in Pitfalls.
Crown Jewel Targets
Supabase is the open-source Firebase alternative. It uses Row Level Security (RLS) for access control, but RLS policies are frequently misconfigured — especially in rapid-development stacks (Lovable.dev, Bolt.new, Cursor).
Highest-value findings:
- Public tables via anon key — REST API with anon key returns table data when RLS is disabled or policies are permissive. Critical.
- RLS bypass via organization_id — UPDATE operation checks user ownership but NOT organization_id -> cross-tenant data access. Critical.
- RPC functions returning global data — SECURITY DEFINER RPC functions that don't filter by auth.uid() -> all users' data. High.
- Storage buckets without RLS — Public file listing, upload, and download. High.
- Open signUp — Anyone can register and get a JWT. High.
- Multi-tenant enumeration — Same broken-RLS patterns across multiple apps built by the same developer. Medium.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- today Changed · +30 lines 4b9849137393
- 2mo ago First seen · 440 lines · 133 tokens per session scan B acdb8dcc0e41
hunt-supabase is a skill published in the GitHub repository uphiago/recon-skills (1,328 stars, last pushed today), licensed MIT. It adds 133 tokens to every session and 5,615 once invoked, about $0.0005 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (downloads and executes remote code, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
hunt-supabase compared with skills from other repositories
| Mod | Type | Stars | Last push | Licence | Scan | Tokens | Works with |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| hunt-supabaseuphiago/recon-skills | Skill | 1.3k | today | MIT | B | 133 | Claude Code, Codex |
| performing-aws-privilege-escalation-assessmentxalgorix/xalgorix | Skill | 1.3k | today | Apache-2.0 | A | 54 | Claude Code, Codex |
| performing-cloud-penetration-testing-with-pacuxalgorix/xalgorix | Skill | 1.3k | today | Apache-2.0 | A | 51 | Claude Code, Codex |
| api-11-nosql-injectionvigilantshield/Claude-HunterKit | Skill | 6 | 3mo ago | none | A | 69 | Claude Code, Codex |
| api-10-sqlivigilantshield/Claude-HunterKit | Skill | 6 | 3mo ago | none | B | 118 | Claude Code, Codex |
| graph-db-writessamugit83/redamon | Skill | 3.3k | 2d ago | MIT | A | 119 | Claude Code, Codex |
| detecting-compromised-cloud-credentialsxalgorix/xalgorix | Skill | 1.3k | today | Apache-2.0 | A | 55 | Claude Code, Codex |