Recon Skills is a pack of security-testing skills covering reconnaissance, web applications, APIs, authentication, vulnerability validation, cloud infrastructure, and reporting. Security professionals use it for authorized assessments of systems they own or have written permission to test. The catalogue entries are individual skills from the pack.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill hunt-tls-networkgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-tls-network)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-tls-network"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-tls-network/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-tls-network"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/hunt-tls-network.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Supply Chain · line 88 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- high YARA Match · line 107 YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
- high YARA Match · line 258 YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00154 | $0.06102 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00077 | $0.03051 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00031 | $0.01220 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00015 | $0.00610 |
Grade C, and why
hunt-tls-network scanned grade C with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Downloads and executes remote codehighSupply chain
curl | sh runs whatever the server returns today, which is not necessarily what it returned when this was reviewed.
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s "https://hstspreload.org/api/v2/status?domain=$TARGET" | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sI "https://$TARGET/" | grep -i "strict-transport-security" How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 392 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
HUNT-TLS-NETWORK — TLS/SSL & DNS Security
Reality Check (Read First)
Most findings in this class are Info/Low and routinely rejected as "best-practice" / "missing-hardening" by triage. This skill exists to stop you wasting a submission. Two questions before you report anything here:
- Is there a real victim and a real action? "Missing HSTS" is not a vulnerability — demonstrated session-cookie capture from a victim you MitM'd is. "Missing CAA" is never a vulnerability you can demonstrate.
- Does the program accept it? Many programs explicitly list missing SPF/DMARC, missing security headers, weak ciphers without exploit, and CAA as out of scope. Read scope first; quote the in-scope line in your report.
What actually pays in this class (in order):
- Dangling-CNAME / dangling-A subdomain takeover — you control content on
target.comsubdomain. Real impact, real bounty. (Owned in depth byhunt-subdomain; covered here for the TLS/DNS recon angle.) - Spoofable DMARC, proven by delivered-to-inbox email — not "p=none exists" but an actual mail from
[email protected]landing in a real inbox with a passing/none DMARC verdict in the headers. - DNS AXFR returning internal hosts — full internal hostname/IP map. Concrete recon value, often Medium.
- mTLS / client-cert bypass on an internal service — reaching authenticated-only functionality without the cert. Real auth bypass = High.
- Exploited TLS weakness with a working decrypt/MitM PoC — almost never achievable remotely in 2024-2026 against a patched stack; see Phase 1 caveats.
What does NOT pay (do not report standalone): missing CAA, missing HSTS with no MitM PoC, missing security headers alone, weak-cipher support without an exploit, self-signed cert on a non-prod host, TLS 1.0/1.1 enabled without a downgrade victim.
Phase 1 — TLS/SSL Audit
# Quick TLS test with testssl.sh
brew install testssl
testssl.sh --fast $TARGET 2>/dev/null | grep -E "CRITICAL|HIGH|MEDIUM|OK|NOT" | head -30
# Or use sslyze (Python)
pip3 install sslyze
python3 -m sslyze $TARGET --json_out /tmp/sslyze_$TARGET.json 2>/dev/null
cat /tmp/sslyze_$TARGET.json | python3 -m json.tool | grep -i "vulnerability\|insecure\|error" | head -20
# Check certificate expiry and chain
echo | openssl s_client -connect $TARGET:443 -servername $TARGET 2>/dev/null | \
openssl x509 -noout -dates -subject -issuer 2>/dev/null
# Check for weak ciphers manually (a successful handshake = the cipher is OFFERED, not exploitable)
openssl s_client -connect $TARGET:443 -cipher RC4-SHA 2>/dev/null | grep -i "cipher\|handshake"
openssl s_client -connect $TARGET:443 -cipher DES-CBC3-SHA 2>/dev/null | grep -i "cipher\|handshake"
# Protocol downgrade surface — TLS 1.0/1.1 still negotiable?
openssl s_client -connect $TARGET:443 -tls1 2>/dev/null | grep -E "Protocol|Cipher"
openssl s_client -connect $TARGET:443 -tls1_1 2>/dev/null | grep -E "Protocol|Cipher"
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 392 lines · 154 tokens per session scan C bc9d0520e7c2
hunt-tls-network is a skill published in the GitHub repository uphiago/recon-skills (1,254 stars, last pushed 10d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 154 tokens to every session and 6,102 once invoked, about $0.0008 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it C with 2 findings (downloads and executes remote code, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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