Recon Skills is a pack of security-testing skills covering reconnaissance, web applications, APIs, authentication, vulnerability validation, cloud infrastructure, and reporting. Security professionals use it for authorized assessments of systems they own or have written permission to test. The catalogue entries are individual skills from the pack.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill phpinfo-to-rcegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/phpinfo-to-rce)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/phpinfo-to-rce"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/phpinfo-to-rce/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/phpinfo-to-rce"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/phpinfo-to-rce.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 194 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high YARA Match · line 204 YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).Fix: Remove the malware payload or compromised file entirely. Investigate how it entered the skill and audit all other artifacts for additional indicators of compromise.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 141 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00020 | $0.02278 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00010 | $0.01139 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00004 | $0.00456 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00228 |
Grade A, and why
phpinfo-to-rce scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
compatibility: Requires curl, nmap, python3, masscan, subfinder, httpx, nuclei How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 214 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
PHPInfo → RCE Chain Skill
Evaluate exposed phpinfo() pages for configuration disclosure and the
prerequisites of a separate execution path. Enabled process functions do not
create RCE without an authorized code or file-execution primitive.
When to Use
source-leak-huntflags a target withinfo.phporphpinfo.phpexposed.- You need to confirm whether RCE is possible before investing in upload vectors.
- Building an attack chain that requires code execution.
- Target has a file upload path (open registration + XMLRPC, contact form, profile image, etc.).
Prerequisites
terminalwith curl.- Confirmed exposed phpinfo page (HTTP 200, contains "PHP Version").
- For RCE: a file upload vector on the same host (XMLRPC with credentials, open registration, contact form, etc.).
How to Run
# Step 1: Fetch phpinfo and check for exec restrictions
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://TARGET/info.php" | grep -i "disable_functions"
# Step 2: If ONLY pcntl_* is disabled, all exec functions are available
# Step 3: Find upload vector and deliver webshell
Quick Reference
| Check | What to Look For | Implication |
|---|---|---|
disable_functions |
Only pcntl_alarm,pcntl_fork,... |
All exec available — RCE possible |
disable_functions |
exec,system,passthru,shell_exec,popen,proc_open |
Exec blocked — need bypass |
allow_url_fopen |
On | Remote file inclusion possible |
allow_url_include |
On | RFI directly possible |
open_basedir |
Not set or /var/www:/tmp |
Wide file access |
display_errors |
On | Error-based information disclosure |
DOCUMENT_ROOT |
/var/www/html or custom |
Know where webshell lands |
SERVER_ADMIN |
Email address | Contact for social engineering |
_SERVER["REMOTE_ADDR"] |
Shows YOUR IP (if behind proxy) | WAF/CDN detection |
| PHP version | < 7.4 | EOL — more unpatched CVEs |
Procedure
Step 1 — Fetch and Analyze PHPInfo
TARGET="$1"
# Full phpinfo dump
curl -sk --max-time 15 --connect-timeout 10 "https://$TARGET/info.php" > /tmp/phpinfo_$TARGET.html
curl -sk --max-time 15 --connect-timeout 10 "https://$TARGET/phpinfo.php" >> /tmp/phpinfo_$TARGET.html 2>/dev/null
# Check if phpinfo is real (not SPA catch-all)
if ! grep -q "PHP Version" /tmp/phpinfo_$TARGET.html; then
echo "[-] Not a real phpinfo page"
exit 1
fi
echo "[+] PHPInfo confirmed on $TARGET"
echo ""
# Extract critical directives
echo "=== PHP Version ==="
grep -Eo 'PHP Version <.*?>[^<]+' /tmp/phpinfo_$TARGET.html | head -1
echo ""
echo "=== disable_functions ==="
DISABLED=$(grep -A1 'disable_functions' /tmp/phpinfo_$TARGET.html | grep -Eo '>(local|master).*?<' | sed 's/[<>]//g')
echo "$DISABLED"
echo ""
echo "=== Exec Functions Available? ==="
if echo "$DISABLED" | grep -qE 'exec|system|passthru|shell_exec|popen|proc_open'; then
echo "[-] Exec functions ARE disabled — RCE blocked via standard methods"
else
echo "[+] Exec functions NOT disabled — RCE POSSIBLE!"
echo "[+] Available: exec, system, passthru, shell_exec, popen, proc_open"
fi
echo ""
echo "=== Other Critical Settings ==="
grep -E '(allow_url_fopen|allow_url_include|open_basedir|display_errors|DOCUMENT_ROOT|SERVER_ADMIN|upload_max_filesize|post_max_size)' /tmp/phpinfo_$TARGET.html | \
sed 's/<[^>]*>//g' | sed 's/\s\+/ /g' | sort -u
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 214 lines · 20 tokens per session scan A fa6bbff5b718
phpinfo-to-rce is a skill published in the GitHub repository uphiago/recon-skills (1,254 stars, last pushed 9d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 20 tokens to every session and 2,278 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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