Recon Skills is a pack of security-testing skills covering reconnaissance, web applications, APIs, authentication, vulnerability validation, cloud infrastructure, and reporting. Security professionals use it for authorized assessments of systems they own or have written permission to test. The catalogue entries are individual skills from the pack.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill staging-subdomain-huntgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/staging-subdomain-hunt)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/staging-subdomain-hunt"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/staging-subdomain-hunt/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/staging-subdomain-hunt"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/staging-subdomain-hunt.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 6 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 168 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 170 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 169 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Supply Chain · line 235 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- high Supply Chain · line 239 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 209 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00022 | $0.03138 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00011 | $0.01569 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00004 | $0.00628 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00314 |
Grade C, and why
staging-subdomain-hunt scanned grade C with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Downloads and executes remote codehighSupply chain
curl | sh runs whatever the server returns today, which is not necessarily what it returned when this was reviewed.
wpsl=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "$sub/wp-json/wpsl/v1/" 2>/dev/null | python3 -c "import sys,json; d=json.load(sys.stdin); print(len(d) if isinstance(d,list) else 'no')" 2>/dev/null) Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
compatibility: Requires curl, nmap, python3, masscan, subfinder, httpx, nuclei How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 263 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Staging & Subdomain Hunt Skill
Discover staging, development, and internal subdomains through certificate transparency (crt.sh), DNS brute force, and web probing. Exploit the staging security gap — staging environments consistently have weaker security than production (no WAF, debug enabled, install pages accessible). Proven on 7 US targets where staging subdomains exposed phpinfo, WordPress install pages, and internal APIs not visible on production.
When to Use
- Running
deep-invadePhase 5 on a high-value target. - Production target is well-secured (WAF, no leaks) — pivot to staging.
- Target has a large attack surface (e-commerce, SaaS, franchise model).
- You need additional entry points when the main site is hardened.
- After
subdomain-enumerationproduces a list of subdomains.
Prerequisites
terminalwith curl, httpx, jq.- Target domain (e.g.,
example.com). - For DNS brute force: wordlist at
./tools/subdomains.txt.
How to Run
DOMAIN="example.com"
# crt.sh discovery
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk "https://crt.sh/?q=%25.$DOMAIN&output=json" | jq -r '.[].name_value' | sed 's/\*\.//g' | sort -u > subs.txt
# Probe for live hosts
httpx -silent -l subs.txt -threads 50 -status-code -tech-detect -o alive_subs.txt
# Check for staging indicators
grep -iE 'staging|stage|dev|test|uat|beta' alive_subs.txt
Quick Reference
| Indicator | What It Means | Action |
|---|---|---|
/wp-admin/install.php returns 200 |
Fresh WordPress — no site configured | Install takeover |
/wp-admin/upgrade.php returns 200 |
WP needs DB upgrade | DB info disclosure |
info.php / phpinfo.php on staging |
Debug enabled | PHPInfo analysis (see phpinfo-to-rce) |
| Staging has no Cloudflare/WAF | Direct origin access | Run full deep-invade on origin IP |
| CORS on staging but not production | Staging has weaker CORS policy | CORS attack from staging context |
.env on staging |
Dev credentials exposed | Credential theft, pivot to production |
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 263 lines · 22 tokens per session scan C ffee411fc8cb
staging-subdomain-hunt is a skill published in the GitHub repository uphiago/recon-skills (1,254 stars, last pushed 9d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 22 tokens to every session and 3,138 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it C with 2 findings (downloads and executes remote code, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
auditing-gcp-iam-permissions
Auditing Google Cloud Platform IAM permissions to identify overly permissive bindings, primitive role usage, service account key proliferation, and cross-project access risks using gcloud CLI, Policy Analyzer, and IAM Recommender.
detecting-compromised-cloud-credentials
Detecting compromised cloud credentials across AWS, Azure, and GCP by analyzing anomalous API activity, impossible travel patterns, unauthorized resource provisioning, and credential abuse indicators using GuardDuty, Defender for Identity, and SCC Event Threat Detection.
implementing-aws-config-rules-for-compliance
Implementing AWS Config rules for continuous compliance monitoring of AWS resources, deploying managed and custom rules aligned to CIS and PCI DSS frameworks, configuring automatic remediation with SSM Automation, and aggregating compliance data across accounts.
implementing-cloud-dlp-for-data-protection
Implementing Cloud Data Loss Prevention (DLP) using Amazon Macie, Azure Information Protection, and Google Cloud DLP API to discover, classify, and protect sensitive data across cloud storage, databases, and data pipelines.
implementing-cloud-trail-log-analysis
Implementing AWS CloudTrail log analysis for security monitoring, threat detection, and forensic investigation using Athena, CloudWatch Logs Insights, and SIEM integration to identify unauthorized access, privilege escalation, and suspicious API activity.
implementing-zero-trust-network-access
Implementing Zero Trust Network Access (ZTNA) in cloud environments by configuring identity-aware proxies, micro-segmentation, continuous verification with conditional access policies, and replacing traditional VPN-based access with BeyondCorp-style architectures across AWS, Azure, and GCP.