Recon Skills is a pack of security-testing skills covering reconnaissance, web applications, APIs, authentication, vulnerability validation, cloud infrastructure, and reporting. Security professionals use it for authorized assessments of systems they own or have written permission to test. The catalogue entries are individual skills from the pack.
Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add uphiago/recon-skills --skill unauth-api-flow-hijackgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/unauth-api-flow-hijack)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/unauth-api-flow-hijack"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/unauth-api-flow-hijack/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/unauth-api-flow-hijack"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/unauth-api-flow-hijack.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 4 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Supply Chain · line 107 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- high Supply Chain · line 121 Remote code is downloaded and executed. This bypasses code review and could introduce malicious code.Fix: Avoid downloading and executing remote scripts. Use trusted packages from PyPI/npm. If remote fetch is required, verify checksums and use HTTPS.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 32 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 121 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00020 | $0.01863 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00932 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00004 | $0.00373 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00186 |
Grade A, and why
unauth-api-flow-hijack scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
compatibility: Requires curl, python3 How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 188 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Unauthenticated API Flow Hijack
Exploit API endpoints that implement a full business workflow (interview, application, checkout, onboarding) without requiring authentication at any step. Unlike simple data exposure, these flows allow an attacker to participate in — and manipulate — the application's core business logic: submitting forms, uploading files, completing transactions, and exporting data. The entire state machine is accessible without credentials.
When to Use
- An API serves a multi-step workflow (start → step1 → step2 → ... → complete).
- No authentication token, session cookie, or API key is required at any step.
- The API returns session identifiers (UUIDs, tokens) that can be reused across steps.
- The workflow includes file upload, data submission, or export functionality.
- Error messages reveal the expected request format (validating that endpoints are live).
Prerequisites
terminalwith curl and python3.- Discovery of at least one API endpoint that accepts POST without authentication.
- The endpoint returns an identifier (session ID, interview ID, token) that can be passed to subsequent steps.
Quick Detection
# Probe common flow-starting endpoints
for ep in /start /api/start /api/v1/start /begin /init /api/init \
/start-interview /api/interview/start /api/session/start; do
code=$(curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -sk -o /tmp/resp.json -w "%{http_code}" \
-X POST "https://target.com$ep" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{}')
if [ "$code" = "200" ] || [ "$code" = "201" ]; then
echo "=== $ep ($code) ==="
cat /tmp/resp.json | python3 -m json.tool 2>/dev/null | head -20
# Extract any returned ID
cat /tmp/resp.json | python3 -c "
import sys,json,re
try:
d=json.load(sys.stdin)
for k in d:
if any(x in k.lower() for x in ['id','token','session','key']):
print(f'{k}: {d[k]}')
except: pass
"
fi
done
Procedure
Phase 1 — Map the Flow
Identify all steps by following the API's natural progression:
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 188 lines · 20 tokens per session scan A 957795b3e63e
unauth-api-flow-hijack is a skill published in the GitHub repository uphiago/recon-skills (1,251 stars, last pushed 9d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 20 tokens to every session and 1,863 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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detecting-s3-data-exfiltration-attempts
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