Recon Skills is a pack of security-testing skills covering reconnaissance, web applications, APIs, authentication, vulnerability validation, cloud infrastructure, and reporting. Security professionals use it for authorized assessments of systems they own or have written permission to test. The catalogue entries are individual skills from the pack.
Getting it into your agent
It runs from inside its repository, so the clone comes first — what it calls does not travel with the file alone.
git clone --depth 1 https://github.com/uphiago/recon-skillsnpx agentmods add skills/uphiago/recon-skills/vhost-enumerationWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/vhost-enumeration)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/vhost-enumeration"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/vhost-enumeration/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/vhost-enumeration"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/uphiago/recon-skills/vhost-enumeration.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 2 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Tool Misuse · line 96 Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.Fix: Limit tool chaining depth and validate the output of each tool before passing it to the next. Require explicit user approval for multi-step chains.
- medium Privilege Escalation · line 96 Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.Fix: Avoid sudo/root unless strictly required. Prefer least-privilege patterns. If elevation is needed, document the justification and scope.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00020 | $0.01571 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00010 | $0.00785 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00004 | $0.00314 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00002 | $0.00157 |
Grade B, and why
vhost-enumeration scanned grade B with 2 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 10d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Asks for rootmediumPrivilege escalation
A mod that escalates privileges can change anything on the machine, not only the project.
echo "TARGET_IP dev.target.com internal.target.com admin.target.com" | sudo tee -a /etc/hosts Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
compatibility: Requires curl, ffuf, dnsx How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 167 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Virtual Host Enumeration
Discover hidden virtual hosts on IP addresses by fuzzing the Host header. Many servers only respond to specific domain names and remain invisible to standard subdomain enumeration. VHOST fuzzing exposes internal services, development environments, and admin panels that share the same IP but answer to different hostnames.
When to Use
- You have a list of target IPs from
skill_view(name='origin-ip-discovery')orskill_view(name='port-service-discovery'). - A server returns default/blank pages for unknown Host headers.
- Subdomain enumeration may have missed internal-only hostnames.
- SSL certificates on an IP list multiple domain names in the SAN field.
- You need to map internal services behind a reverse proxy.
Prerequisites
terminalwith curl, ffuf, dnsx, and httpx.- A DNS wordlist for hostname fuzzing.
- A list of target IP addresses.
Quick Detection
# Basic VHOST fuzz on a single IP
ffuf -u http://TARGET_IP \
-w /path/to/wordlist.txt \
-H "Host: FUZZ.target.com" \
-fs 0 -mc 200,301,302,401,403
Procedure
Phase 1 — Host Header Fuzzing
# Fuzz for virtual hosts matching the target domain pattern
ffuf -u http://TARGET_IP \
-w $DNS_WORDLIST \
-H "Host: FUZZ.target.com" \
-fs DEFAULT_RESPONSE_SIZE \
-mc 200,301,302,401,403 \
-o vhost_ffuf.json
# HTTPS variant
ffuf -u https://target.com \
-w $DNS_WORDLIST \
-H "Host: FUZZ.target.com" \
-mc 200,301,302,401,403
# Fuzz multiple IPs with a wordlist
cat unique_ips.txt | while read ip; do
ffuf -u "http://$ip" \
-w $DNS_WORDLIST \
-H "Host: FUZZ.target.com" \
-fs 0 -mc 200,301,302 -o "vhost_$ip.json"
sleep 0.5
done
Phase 2 — Response Filtering
# Auto-calibrate: ffuf detects default response size and filters it out
ffuf -u http://TARGET_IP \
-w $DNS_WORDLIST \
-H "Host: FUZZ.target.com" \
-ac -sf -s \
-mc 200
# Manual calibration: find the default response size first
curl --max-time 30 --connect-timeout 10 -s http://TARGET_IP -H "Host: nonexistentxxxxx12345.target.com" | wc -c
# Use that size as -fs filter
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 10d ago First seen · 167 lines · 20 tokens per session scan B b895d07f06f3
vhost-enumeration is a skill published in the GitHub repository uphiago/recon-skills (1,251 stars, last pushed 8d ago), licensed MIT. It adds 20 tokens to every session and 1,571 once invoked, about $0.0001 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 2 findings (asks for root, makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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