Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skills --skill defender-for-storagegit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skills/defender-for-storage)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skills/defender-for-storage"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skills/defender-for-storage/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skills/defender-for-storage"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skills/defender-for-storage.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00200 | $0.01760 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00100 | $0.00880 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00040 | $0.00352 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00020 | $0.00176 |
Grade A, and why
defender-for-storage scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 124 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Microsoft Defender for Storage
Defender for Storage protects Azure Blob Storage, Azure Files, and Azure Data Lake Storage Gen2 against malicious uploads, sensitive data exfiltration, and suspicious access patterns. The current generation is Defender for Storage v2, billed per storage account, with optional add-ons for on-upload malware scanning and sensitive data threat detection.
When to use
Protecting Azure Storage accounts that receive uploads from untrusted or partner sources, host application content (web apps, ML datasets), or contain sensitive data classified by Purview. Use this skill for plan rollout, malware-scan tuning, and incident response on storage alerts.
Do not use this skill for SQL/Cosmos data plane protection (defender-for-cloud-hardening),
VM disk-level malware (defender-for-servers), or M365 file workloads
(defender-for-office-365).
Plan and add-ons
| Component | What it does | Cost model |
|---|---|---|
| Defender for Storage v2 (base) | Activity monitoring: anomalous access, suspicious extraction, unusual deletion | Per storage account / month |
| On-upload malware scanning | Defender AV scans every uploaded blob up to 2 GB; result tag + Event Grid event | Per GB scanned (capped per-account configurable) |
| Sensitive data threat detection | Integrates with Purview sensitive-info-types; alerts when sensitive blobs are accessed by suspicious principals | Included in v2 (no extra fee) |
v1 (per-transaction) is deprecated. Migrate any v1-enabled accounts to v2 — it's cheaper and predictable.
Approach
-
Enable Defender for Storage v2 at subscription scope with malware scanning on and a per-account monthly GB cap (default 5,000 GB). Cap prevents runaway costs on high-throughput accounts. Verify: Defender for Cloud → Environment settings → Subscription → Storage shows v2 plan On with malware scanning enabled.
-
Override per storage account for outliers:
- Disable malware scan on append-only logging accounts, large telemetry sinks, or accounts already scanning at the application layer.
- Disable plan entirely on tenant-scoped diagnostic accounts (Activity Logs export, NSG flow logs) where threat detection adds no value.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 124 lines · 200 tokens per session scan A 4d06b8f1c72b
defender-for-storage is a skill published in the GitHub repository vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skills (173 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 200 tokens to every session and 1,760 once invoked, about $0.0010 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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