Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skills --skill iac-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skills/iac-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skills/iac-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skills/iac-security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skills/iac-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skills/iac-security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00243 | $0.02452 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00121 | $0.01226 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00049 | $0.00490 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00024 | $0.00245 |
Grade A, and why
iac-security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 11d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 172 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Infrastructure-as-Code Security on Azure
Most cloud breaches now route through misconfigured infrastructure that was provisioned by code. Hardening the IaC pipeline — Bicep, ARM, Terraform, and the CI/CD that runs them — moves security left of the deploy: misconfigurations get caught at PR review instead of in a Defender for Cloud finding three weeks later.
When to use
Designing or hardening the IaC pipeline (GitHub Actions / Azure DevOps / GitLab) for Azure, including scanning, policy-as-code, pipeline identity, and supply-chain controls.
Do not use this skill for K8s admission control alone (defender-for-containers),
general CI/CD architecture, or app-layer security.
Capability stack
| Layer | Capability |
|---|---|
| Pipeline identity | OIDC federation (no client secrets), Workload Identities Premium |
| Pre-commit / PR-time scanning | Microsoft Security DevOps (MSDO) Action / Extension; Bicep linter; tflint; checkov; trivy; secret scanning |
| Policy-as-code gate | Azure Policy in Audit and Deny modes at deploy; CI evaluation via az policy what-if, Terraform azapi policy preview |
| Posture connect-back | Defender for Cloud DevOps Security connectors to GitHub / Azure DevOps |
| Drift detection | Defender for Cloud, Terraform plan in scheduled CI, GitOps controllers (Flux/ArgoCD) on AKS |
| Supply chain | Signed commits, dependency review, artifact signing (Notation/cosign), allowed module registries |
Approach
-
Replace pipeline secrets with OIDC federation. Every modern Azure CI integration supports federated workload identity:
- GitHub Actions → Azure: federated credential on user-assigned MI; no
AZURE_CREDENTIALSJSON secret. - Azure DevOps → Azure: Workload Identity federation service connection.
Pin federated credentials to specific environments / branches
(
environment:prod, notrepo:org/repo:*). Seeentra-workload-identity.
- GitHub Actions → Azure: federated credential on user-assigned MI; no
-
Minimum scopes for pipeline identity. Per-pipeline service principal/MI with role assignments at RG / resource scope, not subscription Owner. Use deployment stacks (Bicep) for blast-radius containment.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 11d ago First seen · 172 lines · 243 tokens per session scan A 11203049e50a
iac-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skills (172 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 243 tokens to every session and 2,452 once invoked, about $0.0012 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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