Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skills --skill pki-designgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skillsWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skills/pki-design)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skills/pki-design"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skills/pki-design/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skills/pki-design"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skills/pki-design.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00182 | $0.01989 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00091 | $0.00994 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00036 | $0.00398 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00018 | $0.00199 |
Grade A, and why
pki-design scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 12d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 128 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
PKI Design
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) issues and manages the digital certificates that underpin authentication, encryption, and signing. In Azure-centric and hybrid environments this means combining a trusted CA hierarchy, Key Vault storage, automated lifecycle, and certificate-based authentication.
When to use
Designing certificate issuance, distribution, and lifecycle for: Entra phishing-resistant CBA, TLS / mTLS for services, device identity (Wi-Fi 802.1x, VPN), code signing, and S/MIME. Use this skill when the question is "where do certificates come from and how do they renew", not "how do I store one secret".
Do not use this skill for Key Vault secrets/keys (azure-key-vault) or Entra ID model
(entra-id).
Pick the CA strategy by use case
| If the use case is... | CA choice | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Internet-facing TLS (websites, APIs) | Public CA (DigiCert, GlobalSign, Let's Encrypt) | Always; private CAs aren't trusted by browsers |
| Internal app TLS, mTLS, service-to-service | Internal issuing CA (AD CS or managed) | Private CA chain trusted internally |
| Entra certificate-based authentication | Internal CA published to Entra trust store | Pair with strong binding policy |
| Device identity (Wi-Fi 802.1x, VPN) | AD CS or third-party PKI + Intune SCEP/PKCS | Auto-enrollment essential |
| Code signing | EV code signing cert from a public CA | Hardware token; protect aggressively |
| S/MIME email signing/encryption | Third-party public CA (DigiCert, Sectigo) | Internal CAs not trusted by external recipients |
| Short-lived workload certs (Kubernetes) | cert-manager with ACME or internal issuer | Minutes-to-hours TTL |
Rule of thumb: never use a private CA for internet-facing services and never use a public CA for internal certificates at scale (cost + agility). Two distinct chains.
Approach
- Design the CA hierarchy — Offline root CA + one or more online issuing CAs. Root signs issuing CA certs (long validity, e.g. 10-20 years), issuing CAs sign end-entity certs (1-2 year validity). Verify: root CA host is powered off or air-gapped except for CRL signing and issuing CA renewal.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 12d ago First seen · 128 lines · 182 tokens per session scan A 8ab2a052568d
pki-design is a skill published in the GitHub repository vinayaklatthe/microsoft-security-skills (173 stars, last pushed 2mo ago), licensed MIT. It adds 182 tokens to every session and 1,989 once invoked, about $0.0009 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
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