Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add VincentChuWaiChow/vanguard-frontier-agentic --skill contabo-live-storage-operations-guardgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/VincentChuWaiChow/vanguard-frontier-agenticWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/vincentchuwaichow/vanguard-frontier-agentic/contabo-live-storage-operations-guard)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/vincentchuwaichow/vanguard-frontier-agentic/contabo-live-storage-operations-guard"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/vincentchuwaichow/vanguard-frontier-agentic/contabo-live-storage-operations-guard/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/vincentchuwaichow/vanguard-frontier-agentic/contabo-live-storage-operations-guard"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/vincentchuwaichow/vanguard-frontier-agentic/contabo-live-storage-operations-guard.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to medium
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 40 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 42 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
- medium Data Exfiltration · line 73 Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Verify the destination URL is trusted and necessary. Remove or replace with documented APIs. Ensure no secrets, tokens, or PII are transmitted.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00078 | $0.01020 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00039 | $0.00510 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00016 | $0.00204 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00008 | $0.00102 |
Grade A, and why
contabo-live-storage-operations-guard scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
- Contabo has no official Terraform provider or SDK — recommend `cntb` CLI or REST API (curl + jq) for automation. How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 93 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Contabo Live Storage Operations Guard
Purpose
Act as the approval gate for Contabo Object Storage mutations: audit current bucket inventory, access policies, and retention posture, then execute destructive operations only after verified backup evidence and explicit user sign-off.
When to use
Use this skill for:
- Contabo Object Storage bucket inventory and object listing
- Access policy review (bucket ACLs, public access exposure)
- Retention policy enforcement and lifecycle rule audit
- Bucket or object deletion with backup verification gate
- Migration or consolidation of Object Storage across regions
- Generating approval-ready change records for storage mutations
Hard-stop conditions
REFUSE to execute any bucket deletion or destructive Object Storage mutation unless ALL of the following are confirmed in writing:
- Target: Bucket name and full inventory of current objects or confirmed backup location
- Backup evidence: Verified backup of all data to be deleted (location, timestamp, verification method)
- Rollback plan: Documented recovery path if the operation produces unexpected results
- Named approving identity: the full name or authenticated account identifier of the person authorizing this operation (not a role, alias, or ticket number alone)
Lean operating rules
- Contabo has no official Terraform provider or SDK — recommend
cntbCLI or REST API (curl + jq) for automation. - For S3-compatible Object Storage operations, use S3-compatible tools (aws CLI with
--endpoint-urlpointing at the Contabo Object Storage endpoint). - Prefer official Contabo docs (https://api.contabo.com/, https://docs.contabo.com/) and Context7 when live MCP access is unavailable.
- Separate confirmed facts from inference. If state was not queried or shown, say so.
- OAuth2 password grant tokens expire in ~5 minutes — include token refresh handling in all automation examples. Refresh logic must not log token values.
- Include
x-request-id(UUIDv4) in all Contabo REST API calls for support traceability. - S3 access key and secret key for Object Storage API must be stored as environment variables, never hardcoded.
- Inventory current buckets and objects via read-only calls before proposing any mutation.
- Label claims as
live evidence,user-provided sanitized evidence,documentation-based, orinference.
What ships with it
4 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 93 lines · 78 tokens per session scan A 5d7f5416c976
contabo-live-storage-operations-guard is a skill published in the GitHub repository VincentChuWaiChow/vanguard-frontier-agentic (22 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 78 tokens to every session and 1,020 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-04.
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