Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add VincentChuWaiChow/vanguard-frontier-agentic --skill databricks-identity-network-securitygit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/VincentChuWaiChow/vanguard-frontier-agenticWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/vincentchuwaichow/vanguard-frontier-agentic/databricks-identity-network-security)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/vincentchuwaichow/vanguard-frontier-agentic/databricks-identity-network-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/vincentchuwaichow/vanguard-frontier-agentic/databricks-identity-network-security/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/vincentchuwaichow/vanguard-frontier-agentic/databricks-identity-network-security"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/vincentchuwaichow/vanguard-frontier-agentic/databricks-identity-network-security.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 67 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 77 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 106 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00085 | $0.03047 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00043 | $0.01523 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00017 | $0.00609 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00009 | $0.00305 |
Grade A, and why
databricks-identity-network-security scanned grade A with 0 findings against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 8d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Nothing flagged
None of the 26 patterns this scan looks for appear in this file: no shell pipes, no recursive deletes, no credential paths, no hidden text, no instruction-override or anti-refusal phrasing, no agent-config snooping. That is not a guarantee, it is the absence of the things that are checkable.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 144 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
databricks-identity-network-security
Purpose
This skill decides whether Databricks identity and network security are sound: admin roles are properly separated, external identity integration respects limits, credentials are managed securely, token lifecycle is enforced, network boundaries are properly configured, and secret redaction is safe. Security is correct only when account-admin scope is minimal, service principals are API-only, tokens auto-revoke after 90 days, IP access lists and network policies are properly layered, and redaction protects against all logging scenarios.
When to use
- An organization is designing account admin and workspace admin roles and needs role-separation guidance.
- A user is planning to integrate external identity (SCIM, OAuth, federation) and needs to understand limits and provider support.
- A user is designing credential management for CI/CD, batch workloads, or programmatic access and needs service-principal guidance.
- A user is implementing token lifecycle policy and needs to understand automatic revocation and inactivity periods.
- A user is configuring IP access lists or serverless network policies and needs guidance on limits and evaluation order.
When NOT to use
- No admin role assignments or identity configuration are provided — ask for them rather than assuming.
- The request is to create, update, or rotate a token or credential — this is static review, not execution; the path is the live-guard gate.
- The request is about GRANT hierarchy or privilege model — route to
databricks-unity-catalog-governance-agent. - The request is about workspace topology or metastore strategy — route to
databricks-platform-architecture-agent. - The request is about masking or data classification — route to
databricks-data-protection-privacy-agent. - A token, OAuth client secret, or service-principal secret payload is included — deny and flag the exposure.
Scope
- Admin role separation: account, workspace, metastore admins and their responsibilities.
- SCIM and identity federation: user/group/service-principal limits, provider support, nested-group capability.
- Service principal design and lifecycle: API-only access, CI/CD and batch patterns, secret rotation.
- OAuth vs PAT: trade-offs, automatic revocation, inactivity period, admin-enforced max lifetime.
- Account IP access lists: CIDR inventory, block-list evaluation order, PrivateLink bypass.
- Serverless network policies: FQDN and storage allowlists, destination caps, propagation time.
- Secret scopes and redaction: scope naming, permission model, redaction scope (literal value only).
- Least-privilege identity patterns: smallest account-admin group, service-principal delegation.
What ships with it
6 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 8d ago First seen · 144 lines · 85 tokens per session scan A 9ff7b4f9347f
databricks-identity-network-security is a skill published in the GitHub repository VincentChuWaiChow/vanguard-frontier-agentic (22 stars, last pushed today), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 85 tokens to every session and 3,047 once invoked, about $0.0004 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it A with 0 findings. No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-04.
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