Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add wgpsec/AboutSecurity --skill azure-hybrid-lateralgit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/wgpsec/AboutSecurityWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/wgpsec/aboutsecurity/azure-hybrid-lateral)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/wgpsec/aboutsecurity/azure-hybrid-lateral"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/wgpsec/aboutsecurity/azure-hybrid-lateral/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/wgpsec/aboutsecurity/azure-hybrid-lateral"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/wgpsec/aboutsecurity/azure-hybrid-lateral.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 5 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high YARA Match · line 82 YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).Fix: Remove the malware payload or compromised file entirely. Investigate how it entered the skill and audit all other artifacts for additional indicators of compromise.
- high YARA Match · line 93 YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 254 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 254 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high YARA Match · line 277 YARA rule matched a hack tool or exploit indicator (offensive tools, reconnaissance, privilege escalation, or exploit frameworks).Fix: Remove offensive tool references and exploit code. Legitimate agent skills should not contain penetration testing tools, exploit frameworks, or reconnaissance utilities.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00160 | $0.05317 |
| Opus 5.5 | $0.00064 | $0.02127 |
| Sonnet 5.5 | $0.00032 | $0.01063 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00016 | $0.00532 |
Grade A, and why
azure-hybrid-lateral scanned grade A with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 2mo ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Makes network callslowCapability
Not a fault in itself. Listed so you know the mod talks to something, and to what.
curl -s -H "Authorization: Bearer <token>" https://graph.microsoft.com/v1.0/me | jq The source is not reproduced here
No licence file
A repository with no LICENSE is all rights reserved by default, so the body is not copied here. The metadata, the measurements and the link are.
What ships with it
2 files beside SKILL.md in the same directory: the scripts, references and assets a skill reads on demand. Not counted in the per-session cost; read them before you install if any of them is executable.
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 2mo ago First seen · 328 lines · 160 tokens per session scan A 31f071b0a6f0
azure-hybrid-lateral is a skill published in the GitHub repository wgpsec/AboutSecurity (1,839 stars, last pushed 10d ago), with no licence file. It adds 160 tokens to every session and 5,317 once invoked, about $0.0006 per session on Opus 5.5. A static security scan graded it A with 1 finding (makes network calls). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-08-30.
Other skills, from other repositories
terraform-state-leak
Exploit exposed Terraform state files — secrets, cloud creds, RDS passwords, IAM keys, and infrastructure topology in plain JSON.
s3-takeover
Detect and claim dangling S3 buckets referenced by subdomains (CNAME → s3 hostnames where bucket no longer exists).
aws-iam-enum
Enumerate AWS IAM policies, detect privilege escalation paths per Rhino Security Labs canonical 21 primitives.
cloud-overview
Cloud exploitation lane — AWS IAM privesc, S3 takeover, k8s RBAC abuse, Terraform state leaks, cloud metadata pivoting.
gcp-org-escalation
GCP organization-level privilege escalation — cross-project pivoting, org policy bypass, service account impersonation chains, Terraform state secrets, and GKE cluster compromise. Escalate from single-project access to org-wide control.
cicd-secrets-exfil
Extracting CI secrets / OIDC tokens once you have code execution in a build job — echo/printenv exfil, log-masking bypass (base64, char-split, reversal), OIDC token abuse to assume cloud roles, GITHUBTOKEN / CIJOBTOKEN scope abuse, cache / artifact secret leakage, provenance pivot.