Getting it into your agent
One page per mod, every tool's command on it. A separate URL per tool would split the same page into five that compete with each other.
npx skills add xalgorix/xalgorix --skill performing-container-escape-detectiongit clone --depth 1 https://github.com/xalgorix/xalgorixWrote this? Show the measurements
A badge with what this costs and how it scanned, read live from this page, so it follows the numbers instead of freezing them. Markdown for a README, HTML for a documentation site or a project page.
[](https://agentmods.dev/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/performing-container-escape-detection)<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/performing-container-escape-detection"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/performing-container-escape-detection/github.svg" alt="Measured on agentmods" height="20"></a>Or the 80×15 button, for a site that already has a row of RSS and ATOM ones. Only the verdict fits; the numbers stay here.
<a href="https://agentmods.dev/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/performing-container-escape-detection"><img src="https://agentmods.dev/badge/skills/xalgorix/xalgorix/performing-container-escape-detection.svg" alt="Reviewed on agentmods" width="80" height="20"></a>- NVIDIA SkillSpector warn
SkillSpector: 3 findings, up to high
These are SkillSpector’s own severities. On a checked sample its high-severity flags on skills were ~96% false positives — a documented command, a public API, a “never do X” rule — so we show them as a caution to read, not a verdict. Why →
- high Privilege Escalation · line 41 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 44 Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.Fix: Remove references to credential paths. Use environment variables or secrets managers. For docs, use placeholder paths (e.g., /path/to/config). Never load .env or token files in production code paths.
- high Privilege Escalation · line 76 Potential security issue detected. Manual review is recommended.Fix: Review the flagged content for security risks. Ensure no credentials, secrets, or sensitive data are exposed.
What it costs to keep this loaded
Counted locally with the o200k_base tokenizer, which is exact for GPT models; Claude uses its own tokenizer and its counts differ. Treat this as one consistent yardstick across the catalogue rather than a bill. Prices are per million input tokens.
| Model | Per session | Once invoked |
|---|---|---|
| Fable 5.1 | $0.00066 | $0.00850 |
| Opus 5 | $0.00033 | $0.00425 |
| Sonnet 5 | $0.00013 | $0.00170 |
| Haiku 4.5 | $0.00007 | $0.00085 |
Grade B, and why
performing-container-escape-detection scanned grade B with 1 finding against 26 rules in 11 categories — prompt injection, anti-refusal, data exfiltration, privilege escalation, supply chain, agent snooping, system-prompt leakage, SSRF and excessive agency — measured 5d ago.
A static scan of the body, not an audit. Every finding is printed with the line that produced it so you can judge whether it matters here. A mod is markdown that instructs an agent; that is exactly why what it instructs is worth reading.
Reaches for credential filesmediumPrivilege escalation
SSH keys, cloud credentials, git-credentials, .npmrc, /etc/shadow: reading these is how a config file becomes a credential leak.
**Validate, don't conclude-safe from one field:** a single clean field is not a clean pod - enumerate the full matrix above. Where authorized, confirm a finding by actually attempting the escape in a throwaway namespace Downgraded: this mod is about security review, or the phrase is quoted, so it is likely naming the pattern rather than instructing it.
How it starts
The opening of the file, as written. The whole thing — 86 lines — stays where its author put it; the contents beside it link to each section on GitHub.
Performing Container Escape Detection
When to Use
- When conducting security assessments that involve performing container escape detection
- When following incident response procedures for related security events
- When performing scheduled security testing or auditing activities
- When validating security controls through hands-on testing
Detection Gaps & Validation
A pod-spec audit that only reads securityContext.privileged misses most real escape paths. The fields below are the ones detection scripts routinely skip:
- Beyond
privileged: checkallowPrivilegeEscalation,procMount: Unmasked,seccompProfile: Unconfined/absent, and added capabilities individually -SYS_ADMIN,SYS_PTRACE,DAC_READ_SEARCH(CVE-2022-0492 via cgroup release_agent),NET_RAW,SYS_MODULE,BPF. A non-privileged pod withSYS_ADMINstill escapes. - All container types: iterate
spec.containersandspec.initContainersandspec.ephemeralContainers- debug/ephemeral containers are a common blind spot. - Host exposure:
hostPID/hostIPC/hostNetwork, and hostPath mounts beyond/and/etc(/var/run/docker.sock,/var/run/containerd,/proc,/sys, kubelet dirs). Check the mount is writable, not just present. - Pod-level vs container-level securityContext: a setting on one does not imply the other; read both.
Validate, don't conclude-safe from one field: a single clean field is not a clean pod - enumerate the full matrix above. Where authorized, confirm a finding by actually attempting the escape in a throwaway namespace (e.g. mount host root from a SYS_ADMIN pod, or read /host/etc/shadow via a hostPath mount). Cross-check the live audit against runtime detection (Tetragon/Falco) - a static "no privileged pods" result does not mean no escape occurred.
Prerequisites
- Familiarity with container security concepts and tools
- Access to a test or lab environment for safe execution
- Python 3.8+ with required dependencies installed
- Appropriate authorization for any testing activities
What this file has done since we first saw it
Hashed on every crawl. A supply-chain change to an agent config is a question of when, not whether, so the history is kept rather than the latest state alone.
- 5d ago First seen · 86 lines · 66 tokens per session scan B 0f1b2790e132
performing-container-escape-detection is a skill published in the GitHub repository xalgorix/xalgorix (965 stars, last pushed yesterday), licensed Apache-2.0. It adds 66 tokens to every session and 850 once invoked, about $0.0003 per session on Opus 5. A static security scan graded it B with 1 finding (reaches for credential files). No closer match exists in the catalogue, so it is treated as the original; first seen 2026-09-03.
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